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Abstract
Violence has been a part of the LAC region’s landscape since before independence, evolving from interstate to
intrastate, and, more recently, emerging as criminal violence in the 1990s. Today LAC is the world’s most
violent region —home to seven of the ten cities registering the highest homicide rates. According to recent
polling, insecurity is one of citizens’ two top concerns. Guest editor Jose Miguel Cruz unites top scholars to
examine the complex problem from various disciplinary perspectives —history, sociology, political science,
journalism, communications and public policy —to identify the drivers and manifestations of violence in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
Dear Hemisphere readers:
With this issue of Hemisphere, guest-edited by José Miguel Cruz, Director of Research at the Kimberly Green 
Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), we continue our work to understand the complex dynamics 
of crime and insecurity in the Americas. Violence has been part of the region’s political landscape since before 
independence; rather than interstate, however, much of the violence plaguing the region since the twentieth century 
is intrastate, pitting state and non-state actors against each other with the goal of maintaining or seizing political 
and socioeconomic power. As Dr. Cruz indicates, in the 1990s a different type of violence emerged in the region:  
criminal violence, and it reached epidemic levels. Today, Latin America and the Caribbean is the world’s most 
violent region, certainly in terms of homicide rates. Seven of the 10 cities with the highest levels of homicide rates 
are in Latin America and the Caribbean, and citizens there feel the fears and suffer the costs of this insecurity on a 
daily basis. According to recent polling by AmericasBarometer, insecurity is one of the top two concerns of citizens 
in all countries of the region, even in low-crime countries such as Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay.  
Any understanding of the dynamics of criminal violence in Latin America and the Caribbean requires a 
multinational and interdisciplinary approach. Dr. Cruz has brought together an impressive collection of scholars 
from across the region to examine this complex problem from various disciplinary perspectives-history, sociology, 
political science, journalism, communications and public policy. In addition to offering compelling data, this issue 
of Hemisphere provides a diverse set of essays that analyze the drivers and manifestations of violence, including 
weak criminal justice systems, transnational criminal organizations, human and drug trafficking, vigilantism, 
overcrowded prisons, gender-based violence and weakened economies. 
LACC, a long-standing leader in the study of violence in the region, is committed to providing cutting-edge, 
reliable and thought-provoking research on this complex and critical challenge to the stability, security and 
prosperity of the region. Our expectation is that this issue of Hemisphere will provide a comprehensive examination 
of the subject, add to scholarly and policy debates on crime and insecurity in the Americas, and offer academics and 
policymakers alike new insights into the theoretical and practical challenges, as well as solutions.  
Frank O. Mora
Director & Professor
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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F R O M  T H E  G U E S T  E D I T O R
Twenty-five years ago, most Latin American countries were still emerging from the military dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes that had ravaged the region for years. In many of them, an expectation prevailed that a new era 
of political stability, development and economic growth was about to begin. Several countries embarked on promising 
reforms of their public apparatuses, including criminal justice systems and security forces. Civil society participation 
flourished as electoral processes and formal democratic institutions became the norm, and many of the authoritarian-
era constraints imposed on civil and individual rights were shattered.  
By the early 1990s, however, research by the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Pan-
American Health Organization (PAHO) began reporting alarming rates of crime and interpersonal violence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Countries such as Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Jamaica displayed what 
PAHO described as epidemic levels of interpersonal violence, well above the world average. As the decade drew to a 
close, these same organizations warned of the impact of criminal violence on the region’s development and the well- 
being of its citizens. 
Fast-forward 25 years, and the region has been unable to shake off its problems with crime and insecurity. In some 
countries, the situation has gotten much worse. In northern Central America, Venezuela and some parts of Mexico and 
Brazil, criminal violence is so prevalent that it has provoked a humanitarian crisis, with street gangs, vigilante groups 
and rogue armies assuming control and state-like responsibilities over entire communities and rural areas. At the same 
time, some countries, such as Chile, Nicaragua and Uruguay, have managed to keep crime relatively under control, 
and others previously besieged by high levels of crime—Colombia and Guatemala, for example—have enacted policies 
that have succeeded in reducing violence over the last decade.  
Many factors play a role in the dynamics of criminal violence in the region. Researchers have pointed to the 
expansion of transnational criminal organizations, the war on drugs, the erosion of the welfare state, the rapid increase 
of urbanization, the liberalization of political competition, and the peak of the youth bulge as some of the causes.  
At this writing, more study and debate is needed to understand the full dimensions of crime and insecurity and their 
impact on the Americas. 
This issue of Hemisphere aims to contribute to the discussion on criminal violence in Latin America. It recruits 
experts from around the region to examine the historical evolution of crime and insecurity, the role of criminal justice 
systems, the participation of and consequences for young people, and the implications of the victimization of women. 
The contributors also offer new insights into the role of Latin American elites in maintaining public security, the 
“contribution” of the Brazilian security forces, the dynamics of organized crime along the US-Mexican border, and 
representations of women as criminal actors. In addition, the editors have sought to provide a closer look at some of 
the most conspicuous victims of crime and its perpetrators in the region. The photo essay for this issue, for example, 
features stories of people affected by different manifestations of violence. The photos date from the early 2000s, 
underscoring the chronic nature of violence in several countries of the region. This issue also presents excerpts of 
interviews conducted with gang members in El Salvador in 2016 as part of an ongoing LACC research project.  
By including this information, the editors hope to further the debate on crime and insecurity from the perspective not 
only of the academic researchers who study these phenomena, but also the individuals who endure their consequences.
José Miguel Cruz
Director of Research 
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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Sources: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia; U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNODC's Global Study on 
Homicide; Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project; and World Prison Brief.
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Most people from Latin America 
and the Caribbean have low levels 
of trust in their judicial systems. 
In 2012, more than 60% of the adult 
populations of Honduras, Guatemala, 
Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, and 
Belize believed that their local police 
were involved in criminal activities
Sources: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia; U.N. Oce for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Aairs; UNODC’s Global Study on Homicide; Vanderbilt 
University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project; and World Prison Brief.
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L atin America is the world’s most violent region. According to reports released over  the last decade by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) 
and The United Nations Drug and 
Crime Office (UNODC), when 
compared to other world regions, 
crimes in Latin America tend to  
be more violent, murder is 
committed more frequently, and 
the threat or use of physical force 
is more common. Yet, the world’s 
highest levels of poverty are not 
found in Latin America; no major 
racial, ethnic, or religious conflicts 
are taking place there; and the 
region is no longer suffering 
significant political strife. There 
are no wars, and Latin American 
democracies, despite their issues,  
are rather stable. Why then, is  
Latin America so violent?
 
MULTIPLE CRIMINALITY
While having a drink sitting 
in the local bar, a man turns to 
his neighbor, takes out a gun and 
shoots him. Startled, some people 
run away, but one man remains and 
asks:-What happened? The answer 
is succinct:-He gave me a nasty 
look, and I killed him…
This is how violence has played 
out in Latin America for years, and 
it is a common scenario frequently 
repeated in jokes or remarks by 
politicians, pundits and sociologists. 
However, there is not just one 
singular type of violence in Latin 
America; crime in the region has 
become extremely complex and 
acts of violence, many and varied. 
Homicides, assaults and casualties 
occur daily in all countries, but 
crime in Mexico and crime in 
Argentina are not the same, nor 
is the violence in neighboring 
countries, such as Colombia and 
Venezuela. One cannot compare 
violence by guerrilla groups in the 
Colombian jungle to violence by 
Argentine military dictatorships, 
and neither resembles the cruelty 
exerted by the drug lords in Mexico 
or the kingpins who control unit 
sales of maconha in the favelas of 
Rio de Janeiro. When it comes 
to murder, the differences among 
countries are not only substantial in 
terms of numbers, but also in terms 
of significance and political impact.
One can group violence in Latin 
America into two distinct periods. 
Before the 1990s, widespread 
violence was linked to conflicts over 
power; after the 1990s, violence 
linked to extortion emerged. The 
manifestations of violence changed 
in the 1980s during the so-called 
“Lost Decade,” which served as an 
important transition period. During 
that time, crime increased, and 
violence became more urban than 
rural, more criminal than political, 
and more quotidian than sporadic.
The following pages analyze 
the types of violence that came to 
characterize each period and how 
they changed over time. Some cities, 
such as Medellín or São Paulo,  
have managed to reduce homicide 
and crime levels, while others,  
such as Caracas or San Pedro Sula, 
have faced dramatic increases. Rates 
of change are also inconsistent 
across the region. In some cases, 
things have improved or worsened 
in very short periods of time, while 
in others, they have remained stable 
or changed so gradually that the 
shift has gone virtually unnoticed. 
The discussion concludes with the 
analysis of common denominators 
among countries suffering extreme 
violence and draws conclusions that 
may help us review public policies of 
prevention and crime control. 
 
VIOLENCE BEFORE  
THE 1990s 
By the end of the last century, 
three types of violence characterized 
the region: violence by landowners; 
violence by dictatorships; and 
violence spawned by insurgents and 
guerrillas. Linked to fights for power 
and control over territory, violence 
up to the 1990s mostly involved 
struggles to establish social order 
and authority and was also used 
as a tool to maintain, reinforce or 
undermine power.
Violence by large landowners
Violence in Latin America was, 
for a long time, concentrated in 
rural areas. A developed state did 
not exist in many zones, nor did 
a robust legal system that would 
allow the resolution of conflicts 
via independent courts of law. 
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in  
his classic novel, Facundo, posited 
that the expansive rural areas of 
the region, and those who lived 
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there, exemplified “barbarism.” 
The only means to achieve progress 
and further development required 
that the inhabitants of those 
regions be “tamed” and exposed to 
“civilization;” namely, the city and 
the law. As part of this rationale, 
economic and political power had 
to be exerted-and was done so, to 
a large extent-by private armies 
formed and controlled by large 
landowners. In many cases, large 
landowners served as predecessors 
to a not yet consolidated state and 
wielded their power by legitimizing  
the use of force. This experience in 
Latin America laid the foundation 
for the future development of an 
ever-changing landscape of violence.
Although expressions of 
violence have varied across time, 
commonalities do exist. Violence 
inflicted at the hands of so-called 
coroneles in the northeast of Brazil  
shares characteristics with the many 
stories of violence related to the 
rise of paramilitary groups in the 
Colombian Urabá (Antioquia) and 
the murders of indigenous people 
in Guatemala. In each case, violence 
has been the result of the constant 
struggle for control of land. Another 
root cause is the failure of societies  
to develop, provide and utilize 
effective tools to ensure peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and give 
citizens the opportunity to  
exercise their rights. 
Violence by dictatorships
In Latin America, traditional 
autocracies took it upon themselves 
to “civilize” their countries and 
modernize society with the creation 
of a state that would control social 
relations by law rather than by 
force. The process also stressed 
the need for a kind of “Caesar,” or 
enlightened dictator, who, with 
wisdom and an iron fist, would 
guide, educate, and also subjugate 
society. The outcomes of these 
exercises have varied greatly.  
Literary masterpieces such as El 
Señor Presidente by Miguel Angel 
Asturias, El otoño del patriarca by 
Gabriel García Márquez, and La 
fiesta del chivo by Mario Vargas Llosa 
Soldiers patrolling the street outside a children’s day-care facility in a gang-controlled neighborhood in Ilopango, El Salvador. August 31, 2015.
SALVADOR MELENDEZ
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provide compelling backdrops for 
their portrayals of dictators who 
have absolute control over society 
and exercise power through extra- 
judicial violence.
In contrast, the relatively recent 
Argentine, Chilean or Uruguayan 
dictatorships formed in a new 
environment, and for a different 
purpose, in the confrontational 
context of the Cold War. 
The violence exerted by these 
dictatorships was intended to 
dominate the political opposition, 
whose regime leaders were defined 
not only as social enemies or rivals 
for political power, but also as 
foreign agents acting domestically. 
In the end, the conflict was 
ideological and political, and 
merited an all-out “war” in the eyes 
of the regimes. It was that belief that 
led rulers to commit brutal acts of 
violence and extreme violations of 
human rights.
Another case of violence that  
is rarely mentioned in the region,  
perhaps due to a kind of convenient  
self-censorship by Latin American 
intellectuals and leftists, is the one 
exercised for decades by Cuba. 
The Cuban regime, dressed in 
revolutionary garb and shouting 
slogans of liberation, has used 
violence against its political enemies, 
accusing them of being counter-
revolutionaries and foreign agents, 
just as the Argentine and Chilean 
dictatorships did in their time.
Violence by guerrillas
Responses to violence have been 
equally violent. Peasant insurrection 
emerged in rural societies in Latin 
America, and the use of violence  
was central to these movements. 
These “agrarian” uprisings, which 
occurred from Mexico to Chile, 
have become mythologized, but 
in fact, their results have been 
mixed. This is also true of the 
liberal guerrillas in Colombia who 
launched the “Guerra del Llano” in 
the 1950s. Using violence as a tool, 
they managed to defeat the army 
and impose their law in certain 
territories, but they ultimately 
failed to uphold their achievements. 
Regardless, by the end of the 
1950s, thanks to the victory of the 
Cuban revolution, armed guerrilla 
movements as a violent reaction 
to oppressive government became 
consolidated as a viable political 
alternative in Latin America.
Starting in the 1960s, guerrilla 
warfare, which sought to seize 
political power by armed force, 
became one of the most significant 
expressions of violence in the region. 
The political thesis was simple:  
A group of courageous leaders 
would begin their guerrilla war 
in a hotbed of discontent, with 
the intention of arousing support 
among the local population to 
expand their operation into a 
political and military movement 
and, ultimately, overthrow the 
established authorities. The 
characteristics of this expression 
of violence were specific to each 
country. The Venezuelan Armed 
Forces of National Liberation 
(FALN) were not the same 
as Argentina’s Montoneros or 
Uruguay’s Tupamaros. All of them, 
however, were part of a broad 
support initiative for the “anti-
imperialist war” that garnered 
public attention following the Tri-
Continental Conference held  
in Havana in 1966.
The guerrilla cycle of violence 
in the region has been winding 
down due to the defeat of most of 
the groups and their integration 
into the mainstream political 
arena. This is the case of the 
Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path 
in Peru, and Colombia’s FARC, 
the oldest guerrilla organization 
in Latin America, whose original 
leaders simply died of old age. The 
FARC’s new leadership eventually 
acknowledged that its tactics 
and methods were no longer 
effective and recently put down 
their weapons in a historic peace 
agreement with the Colombian 
government. Such agreements 
by themselves do not mean that 
the violence is over, but they do 
represent a significant step forward. 
As the Colombian novelist Héctor 
Abad, whose father was murdered 
by guerrillas, recently wrote, the 
text of the Colombian peace accord 
has a lot more poetry than the real 
and practical prose of national 
reconciliation. But it should also 
be acknowledged that it was poetry 
more than tactics that led to the 
rise of guerrilla movements in the 
region, and thus, it stands to reason 
that a dose of poetry may also help 
with the peacemaking.  
 
VIOLENCE AFTER  
THE 1990s
Over time, the drug business 
became a primary source of income 
for criminal groups. This, along 
with the end of the Soviet Union 
and the Cold War, led to the de-
politicization of everyday life and 
the rise of another kind of violence.
Drug violence
The drug market has become 
one of the great drivers of crime 
in the region. It is a vast market, 
and its revenues and capacity to 
reinvent itself and move in and out 
of legal and illegal worlds make 
the stakes very high. The violence 
exercised by the drug cartels in 
Colombia and Mexico to control 
production zones or shipping routes 
has taken unimaginable forms. In 
the northern triangle of Central 
America (El Salvador, Honduras, 
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and Guatemala), violence has also 
mutated dramatically due to drugs. 
El Salvador, which for years bled out 
from a war between the government 
and guerrillas, was able to reach 
a peace accord, putting an end to 
long-held hostilities. However, 
new opportunities created by the 
drug trade revived crime, and old 
combatants morphed into common 
criminals who supported drug 
shipping routes to Mexico and the 
United States. In Colombia, the 
drug business ensured a stable source 
of income for the guerrillas, and it 
was thanks to that money that they 
were able to acquire sophisticated 
weaponry and pay competitive 
salaries to combatants, even though 
over time, drug trafficking destroyed 
the insurgents politically, corrupted 
them, damaged their credibility  
and eroded sympathy from  
the population.
Violence tied to drugs has two 
functions. First, violent force is 
used to defend or conquer  markets. 
In Latin America, supply exceeds 
demand due to the low number 
of Latin American users and their 
limited purchasing power. The 
easiest way to enhance revenue is 
by stealing market share from other 
retailers, unleashing fierce clashes 
between criminal organizations. The 
second function of drug violence is 
related to the illegal nature of the 
business. Despite being unlawful 
and criminal, the drug industry is 
highly regulated, but based on verbal 
agreements among multiple actors 
and intermediaries. Since there is no 
formal way to guarantee that actors 
abide by these verbal contracts, the 
threat or use of violence is the most 
efficient way to force compliance. 
Such has been the case in Colombia 
and, currently, in Mexico.
Violence by youth gangs
While kingpins of the drug trade 
are behind the waves of violence, 
young gang members are usually on 
the frontlines and more than willing 
to serve as reliable executioners. 
Typically, gangs are formed by 
groups of friends that, in the 
process of peer socialization, enter 
the organizations, seeking identity 
and hope for the future. They are 
integrated from an early age, and 
as a result of their activities, life 
expectancy is significantly reduced. 
In the big cities of almost every 
country, gangs represent models 
of successful social organization, 
especially in poor areas, slums 
and favelas. Youth gangs serve as 
operatives; they are the ones in 
charge of dealing the drugs, and are 
also responsible for the robberies, 
assaults and property crimes 
that support their organizations. 
(Personal items and jewelry have 
been replaced by cellphones and 
tablets as the gangs’ loot of choice).
Gangs are part of the communities 
in which their members live, and 
their identity and the complicit 
silence (or support) that they receive 
correspond to their turf. They are 
feared and valued at the same time 
because, in the absence of police 
protection, local gangs establish 
themselves as the only defense 
inhabitants have against potential 
violent aggression by other gangs. 
This protective function, despite its 
associated acts of violence, grants 
them recognition that reinforces 
their local status and strengthens 
their ability to attract new young 
members. It is through youth gangs, 
and violence, that some young 
people are able to improve their 
economic and social status.
Gang wars have resulted in  
many deaths in cities across the 
region. Each war has its own 
dynamics, and thus, should be 
interpreted in a wider context. 
Analyses of the causes and effects  
of gang wars must go beyond  
“small business” or “defense 
of market” models; gang wars 
are about clashes over territory, 
community protection and 
identity, and are extremely violent. 
Although gangs are responsible for 
carrying out violent acts, they are 
viewed by the communities, and 
by their members, as self-defense 
mechanisms. As long as there is 
no state strong enough to provide 
effective protection for those who 
live in a particular neighborhood, 
the gang that controls that 
neighborhood will continue to 
operate and perpetrate violence.
Organized crime violence
Over time, guerrilla groups, drug 
dealers and gangs have gradually 
become complex organizations 
directly linked to organized crime. 
Following the definitions of the 
Palermo Convention, most nations’ 
laws define organized crime as 
three or more people who commit 
a crime on a recurring basis and 
for economic purposes. In Latin 
America, organized crime involves 
structures with a lot more than 
three people and a robust hierarchy 
that allows for the delegation of 
tasks and a line of command. The 
Central American maras, the First 
Command of the Capital (PCC) 
of Brazil, and the bandas criminales 
(bacrim) in Colombia are clear 
expressions of this phenomenon, 
as are the surviving guerrillas or 
paramilitary groups, given their 
actions and means of control. The 
most important difference has to do  
with changes in the way revenue  
is generated.
Gangs make their income via 
predatory crime, stealing from 
people and retailers, kidnapping, 
contracting hit men, and charging 
for the delivery of “security services.” 
16224_SIPA_LACC-Hemisphere Mag 2017.indd   10 7/25/17   12:47 PM
Hemisphere Volume 26 11
Feature
A battalion of the Military Police Special Operations unit occupied the favelas of Parque União, Nova Holanda, and Mare in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on 
March 25, 2014. WILTON JUNIOR/ESTADAO CONTEUDO/Agencia Estado via AP Images
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As is common in organized crime, 
they also branch out into extortion. 
Organized crime victims are not 
robbed, kidnapped or murdered; 
they are simply charged a small fee 
on a weekly or monthly basis to 
avoid harm. In other words, the 
business of organized crime is the 
protection of its victims. Organized 
crime entities extort victims for 
protection from other crime groups 
and, of course, from themselves. 
This difference between gang 
activities and the mafia-type 
activities of organized crime 
affords two important advantages 
to the latter. On one hand, while 
it is true that a larger amount of 
money can be obtained from a 
single operation—i.e. theft or the 
kidnapping of a businessman—it 
is also true that extorting small 
amounts of money from many 
people can generate high levels of 
income. Moreover, those operations 
can be done in a recurring and 
parasitic fashion, guaranteeing 
a constant flow of cash for the 
organization. The regular income 
allows for “improving” the criminal 
organization; it enables it to 
buy better weaponry, expand or 
guarantee the permanence of its 
members, and pay necessary bribes 
to the authorities.
In those areas where it manages 
to establish itself, organized crime 
replaces the state and roguishly 
carries out its functions, as has 
happened in the vast border region  
between Colombia and Venezuela: 
in the states of César, Norte 
de Santander and Meta on the 
Colombian side, and Zulia, Tachira, 
and Apure in Venezuela. To ensure 
that nothing happens to them or 
their families—and to remove the 
risk of losing even one emaciated 
cow—the guerrilla and paramilitary 
groups impose laws and sanctions 
and, as is common in organized 
crime, charge businesspeople, 
transporters and farmers a monthly 
fee they call a “vaccine.” 
Police and prison violence
The state’s answer to crime has 
also been a violent one, sometimes 
as a legitimate exercise and 
sometimes as an illegal response 
done in a criminal fashion and 
resulting in increased violence. 
Prisons that should be safe and 
controlled spaces end up serving 
as headquarters for criminal 
coordination, the dissemination  
of violence and illicit exports. 
Although police forces have 
improved in many cities and 
countries, many still have difficulties 
addressing crime. Perhaps the most 
powerful obstacle facing police 
is a lack of trust from the people 
they serve. Except for the Chilean 
Carabineros and, more recently, 
the Colombian National Police, 
public opinion surveys show low 
levels of public trust in and respect 
for police organizations in Latin 
America. (See the infographic on 
page 6). Changing public opinion 
is no easy task. Generally speaking, 
the processes used to select police in 
Latin America are inadequate and, 
once recruited, officers are poorly 
trained and severely underpaid. 
Additionally, the military’s strong 
focus on tactics, doctrine and 
organization have altered police 
practices and image. Police are 
viewed as defenders of government 
interests rather than guardians of 
citizen security.
Police institutions must also 
grapple with two types of crime 
within their own ranks. The first 
type results from officers taking 
justice into their own hands when 
the system fails to prosecute and 
sentence apprehended criminals. 
Such practices have led to the 
emergence of an institutional culture 
in which police believe they are not 
only the law, but also above the law. 
The second type develops over time 
and on the job. Essentially, police 
officers become corrupted, complicit 
and ultimately involved in criminal 
activities. They end up either 
extorting criminals or morphing 
into offenders who use their 
knowledge and badge as a license  
to break the law.
Gender violence
Approximately 90% of violent 
crime victims are male, but 
experiences in Brazil show that 
gender-based violence is also a 
problem. Before the Peacekeeping 
Police Units (UPP) arrived in the 
favelas of Rio de Janeiro, there 
were virtually no complaints of 
violence against women in those 
communities. The issue seemed to  
be nonexistent and without political 
or social relevance. Ultimately,  
the UPP managed to physically 
remove the criminal organizations,  
or quadrilhas, from the favelas.  
The moment they did so, crime 
decreased; complaints about gender 
violence however, significantly 
increased. These changes are 
attributed to the fact that the 
displacement of the criminal 
organizations from the areas they 
controlled provided state social 
services with an entrée into the 
communities, and thus, a space for 
the reporting or denouncement 
of gender violence. With a focus 
no longer fully consumed by the 
violence of the quadrilhas, people 
were able to look at violence more 
closely, and new realities came to 
light. When attention shifted to 
issues related to families, households 
and labor markets, gender violence 
emerged unmistakably. This stands to 
reason considering that on a micro-
social level, violence against women is 
16224_SIPA_LACC-Hemisphere Mag 2017.indd   12 7/25/17   12:47 PM
Hemisphere Volume 26 13
Feature
about power, money, sexuality and all 
of the associated complexities. 
One particular and often surprising 
characteristic of gender-based 
violence is that the most lethal 
homicides and life-threatening 
injuries are generally committed 
against men. Gender-based violence 
against women may also be deadly, 
but in general, the violence women 
experience tends to be more chronic 
rather than lethal. For example, 
women tend to suffer injury more 
often than homicide and are 
especially vulnerable to violent 
robbery. (Regarding non-violent 
theft, male and female victimization 
rates are almost the same). 
To address gender-based violence 
and policy, governments have 
created laws and special offices 
to field complaints and protect 
potential victims. Significant 
progress has been made in almost 
every country, but more effective 
strategies need to be developed. 
For example, gender-based violence 
must be viewed in the context of 
the general crime trends of a given 
country when developing policy. 
Additionally, it is important to 
consider women’s perspectives and 
draw from the female experience. 
Historically in the region, an 
androcentric vision has driven anti-
violence policies and favored the 
use of military-oriented responses 
to social problems. Women’s 
perspectives would improve 
effectiveness and efficiency.
THE HETEROGENEITY  
OF VIOLENCE ACROSS  
THE REGION
Although world statistics rank 
Latin America as the most violent 
region in the world, the truth is 
that levels of violence vary greatly 
from country to country and even 
from province to province. If one 
considers Colombia’s past or the 
current situation in Venezuela and 
El Salvador, extraordinary levels of 
violence predominate. However, in 
other countries in the region, such 
as Uruguay, Chile or Costa Rica, 
homicide rates have been lower than 
in the United States for years.
Such variations in levels of 
violence must be highlighted and 
understood. Currently, the Latin 
American region could be divided 
into three groups: countries that are 
becoming more secure; countries 
where violence and criminality 
are rising; and countries that are 
managing to keep their public 
security conditions stable. 
Colombia presents the most 
significant change in the region. 
After decades of rural guerrillas, 
deadly struggles between drug 
trafficking organizations and 
paramilitary violence, Colombia 
has undergone a remarkable 
transformation. The country has 
seen a significant reduction in its 
homicide, kidnapping and robbery 
rates for over a decade. Cities such 
as Medellín and Bogotá, whose 
inhabitants once lived under a 
constant state of siege due to crime, 
today enjoy a much safer public 
space. Colombia’s oldest and most 
infamous guerrilla group, the FARC, 
has already announced a cease-
fire and the incorporation of its 
combatants into civil life. Of course, 
the country is not yet a paradise and 
many problems and risks persist. 
Colombia’s murder rate has been 
cut in half when compared to its 
levels in the mid-1990s; however, 
its homicide rate of 30 per 100,000 
inhabitants is still high. In addition, 
one guerrilla group, the ELN, 
remains operational, and the risk of 
recently demobilized FARC guerrilla 
combatants becoming common 
criminals is very high. 
Another country that has 
experienced important changes is 
Brazil. For a long time, the country’s 
image was based on a belief in two 
Brazils. Called “Belindia” by some 
authors, one was the rich, beautiful 
(“Bel”) south and the other, the 
poor (“India”) north. Historically, 
Brazil’s violence was concentrated 
in the rich states of the south (São 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas 
Gerais), and not in the impoverished 
areas of the north. This situation 
has changed in the last two decades 
thanks to policies applied in the 
south to reduce crime, especially 
in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
Violence and crime have essentially 
been displaced to the northeast, 
where now, not only the state of 
Pernambuco but also others like 
Ceará show high levels of violence. 
All in all, between the decrease of 
violence and crime in some areas 
and the increase in others, the 
country has managed to maintain 
the homicide rate at about 23 per 
100,000 inhabitants.
Another country that has 
significantly reduced its levels  
of violence is Peru. The violence  
and terror of Sendero Luminoso  
was ultimately brought to an 
end thanks to the authorities and 
citizenry. Moving freely through  
the streets and traveling across  
the country safely was once 
impossible, but all of that has 
changed in just a few years.  
There is no consensus among 
analysts and observers as to the 
reasons for these particular changes, 
but, most agree, they should not  
be underestimated.
On the opposite extreme, two 
countries that thirty years ago 
did not even appear on the list 
of “danger zones” today have the 
distinction of being considered the 
most violent nations in a region  
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already known for being violent. 
These countries are Venezuela and 
Honduras. For years, Venezuela was 
not considered a dangerous country; 
it had defeated a guerrilla force and 
managed to maintain high levels of 
prosperity and social mobility. In 
fact, some studies of violence did 
not even include Venezuela as part 
of the research because the country 
did not “qualify.” Since then, the 
major failures of both the Chávez 
and Maduro administrations, and 
their so-called class struggle and 
revolution, have destroyed the 
economy, the gross national product 
and the fabric of society. Although 
the Venezuelan government has 
strictly censored crime data for more 
than a decade, some top government 
officials put the homicide rate at 62 
per 100,000 inhabitants, while other 
independent sources estimate it at 
about 90 per 100,000.
El Salvador, which for years 
suffered political violence and, later,  
criminal gangs, is a more ambiguous 
case. The government and the 
gangs, or maras, negotiated an 
agreement in an effort to reduce 
violence and homicides. This so-
called “truce” generated a great deal 
of hope, and many Salvadorans 
expected to see the development 
and implementation of conciliatory 
policies. However, recent evidence 
has shown that instead of the truce 
weakening the gangs and reducing 
violence, youth gangs have managed 
to exploit it and further strengthen 
themselves. They have kept their 
territorial domain intact and 
continue to contribute to ever-
increasing levels of homicide.
In Mexico, the high crime and 
violence areas of the north, such 
as Chihuahua and Sonora, coexist 
with the rather peaceful Yucatan 
Peninsula, including Quintana 
Roo. Mexico City, despite its large 
population, has a homicide rate 
of fewer than 10 per 100,000, a 
A FARC guerrilla couple takes care of a baby at their camp at the Transitional Standardization Zone in Pondores, Colombia on April 3, 2017. The 
Colombian government is building accommodations that will house FARC guerrillas until the end of the disarmament process, as per the November 
2016 peace agreement. JOAQUIN SARMIENTO/AFP/Getty Images
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lower rate when compared to other 
cities. The country of Mexico as a 
whole experienced a slow but steady 
reduction from the 1990s until 2008. 
Then, as a result of changes in the  
drug market and an aggressive 
security policy, power structures and 
illicit markets underwent significant 
transformations and imbalances, 
resulting in an increase in drug 
trafficking-related violence.
While the current situations in  
Venezuela, Honduras, El Salvador 
and Mexico seem grim, other 
countries in the region have kept  
their levels of violence and crime  
relatively stable and low in 
comparison. These include Chile, 
Uruguay and Argentina in the 
Southern Cone; and Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua in Central America. 
Although each country’s social and 
political conditions differ from the 
next, all have homicide rates lower 
than ten per 100,000 inhabitants. In 
the case of the countries with mid-
level crime rates, Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Paraguay, experts hypothesize 
that existing mechanisms of 
traditional social control underpin 
the legitimacy of coercive force and 
help mitigate crime in both rural 
and suburban communities.
An always provisional balance
The manifestations of violence in 
Latin America reflect a landscape 
even more diverse and dynamic 
than we have been able to convey 
in this article. If we seek to draw 
conclusions, we can state that crime 
has moved from rural to urban areas, 
that conflict between power and 
subversion (or political opposition) 
has been displaced by conflict and 
violence related to illegal business 
and extortion economies, and that 
extra-judicial violence by security 
forces and the ever-deteriorating 
control of prison environments have 
undermined the rule of law.
A fair share of the academic 
literature and political discourse 
on this topic has been devoted to 
explaining crime as the result of 
precarious social conditions, and it 
can be argued that poverty, family 
abandonment and inequality are 
indeed behind much of the violence. 
The experiences of countries that 
have managed to reduce homicides 
and crime points us in another 
direction, however. During the 
period in which violence in 
Colombia declined, poverty did 
not, nor did inequality. In Brazil, 
violence is somehow under control 
and, at the same time, successful 
social programs have reduced 
poverty levels and increased school 
attendance and employment. In 
Venezuela, where official data 
indicate that poverty and inequality 
dropped more than in Brazil 
during the same years, the opposite 
happened, despite the redistribution 
of wealth from increased oil 
revenues. Homicides, kidnapping, 
robberies and drug trafficking rose 
like never before in the history of 
the country. What is clear from 
these experiences, whether positive 
or negative, is that in Brazil and 
Colombia institutions and the rule 
of law were strengthened, whereas in 
Venezuela they were destroyed. 
The changing face of violence 
in Latin America indicates that 
social programs are necessary 
but insufficient and that law 
enforcement policies are important 
so long as excessive force or 
corrupt criminal police activities 
do not distort or undermine them. 
Controlling and reducing violence 
and crime requires reinforcing 
the social pact, strengthening the 
rules of the game, and bolstering 
institutions. Safety and peace entail 
the construction of democracy and 
the strengthening of the citizenry, 
not to mention the consolidation 
and expansion of a collective space 
where diverse groups can coexist and 
imagine themselves sharing a future. 
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universities to study and prevent violence.
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Homicide Rates in Mexico & Central America | 2003-2015 
(Rate x 100,000 population)
Homicide Rates in Selected Caribbean Countries & Puerto Rico | 2003-2015 
(Rate x 100,000 population)
Source: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean 
             https://homicide.igarape.org.br/ UNODC Homicide Statistics: Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants (2000-2014).
Source: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean 
             https://homicide.igarape.org.br/ UNODC Homicide Statistics: Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants (2000-2014). 
            Only partial data available for Cuba, Haiti and Trinidad & Tobago.
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Homicide Rates in the Andes | 2003-2015 
(Rate x 100,000 population)
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Homicide Rates in the Southern Cone, Brazil & Paraguay | 2003-2015 
(Rate x 100,000 population)
Source: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean 
             https://homicide.igarape.org.br/ UNODC Homicide Statistics: Homicides per 100,000 Inhabitants (2000-2014). 
            Only partial data available for Bolivia.
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Data 
Source: Jaitman, Laura & Ivan Torre. 2017. “Estimation of the Direct Costs of Crime and Violence.” In The Costs of Crime and Violence: New  
            Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean. Laura Jaitman (editor). Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, p.27.
Source: UNODC Robbery Statistics: Robberies per 100,000 Inhabitants (2003-2014). Data for Venezuela: Centro para la Paz y los Derechos  
             Humanos Tasa de Robos por 100 mil Habitantes (2003-2007). Data compiled by Daniel Barrera.
Cost of Crime in Latin American Countries as a Percentage of GDP in 2014
Robbery Rates in Latin America and the Caribbean | 2003-2014 
(Rate x 100,000 inhabitants)
Percentage of GDP
Honduras
El Salvador
Jamaica
Brazil
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Paraguay
Colombia
Guatemala
Argentina
Peru
Chile
Uruguay
Mexico
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Puerto Rico
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
423.1
230.4
143.2
291.7
149
401.4
128.9
470.4
228.8
93.8
475.6
152.1
157.3
277.5
111
907.7
93.9
403
93.9
501.1
346.7
81.7
83.3
470.1
397.4
158.1
165.1
291.7
103
895
91.8
469.3
480.7
125.3
950.3
377
93.8
67.9
74.6
489.5
446.7
172.9
153
164.6
266.2
103
849
111
481.2
567.7
115.6
908.3
95.3
69.5
59.2
539.8
184.7
179.1
147.1
274.7
106
957.9
137.4
479.8
538.5
107.6
974.9
99.9
71.6
97.9
571.3
224.7
180.4
146.6
149.9
319.5
136.2
463
546.1
134.5
1014.8
356.9
107.6
26.6
110.8
582.6
228.8
213.4
163.9
168.2
338.7
125.7
544.3
480
133.8
950.1
362.3
89.7
22
104.1
622.3
495.5
262.6
220.3
175.6
193.4
409.8
117.8
542.1
534.7
146.2
878.8
476.2
95.3
22.7
325.5
112.4
624.6
262.6
214.7
174.6
217.4
443.1
140.7
484
469.6
176.3
20.6
557
90.9
24.9
254.3
100.3
611.9
268.1
235.2
170.4
253.4
453.8
495.7
529.5
197.4
1018.9
601.5
87.8
24.2
237.9
96.3
588.9
274
163
261.3
490.6
598.7
197.5
1095.6
144.2
570.6
77.5
19.4
81.3
307.1
140.3
250.5
542.8
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
16224_SIPA_LACC-Hemisphere Mag 2017.indd   18 7/25/17   12:47 PM
Hemisphere Volume 26 19
I t has been four decades since Diana E.H. Russell shed light on the gendered dimension of violence with her definition of femicide as “the killing 
of females by males because they 
are female.” The sexual politics of 
murder, she explained, played a role 
in perpetuating this form of violence 
across historical periods and regions. 
In the Latin American context, 
scholars such as Marcela Lagarde 
adopted and further developed 
the term, and the Spanish word 
feminicidio has become a valuable 
tool for mobilizing different sectors 
of society. It has been central to 
the campaign to raise awareness of 
the killings of hundreds of young 
women, many of them maquila 
workers, in the Mexican border 
city of Ciudad Juárez, and to the 
struggle and demands of women’s 
movements in countries such as 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, 
Nicaragua and Brazil.
As is often the case with concepts 
that travel, Lagarde’s feminicidio 
was not merely a translation of 
Russell’s definition. In Latin 
America, impunity became a key 
explanatory factor for the scope of 
the problem and its persistence. The 
politics and meaning of feminicidio 
refer specifically to the actions 
and omissions of state institutions 
and public officials that add to 
the reproduction of this form of 
violence in Latin America. In this 
article, we analyze quantitative 
aspects and patterns of femicide, 
concluding with some reflections  
on its political dimensions.
Rates of femicide in the region
According to a 2012 Small Arms 
Survey report, 25 of the countries 
with high and very high incidences 
of femicide are in the Americas. El 
Salvador tops the list, followed by 
Jamaica, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Bolivia and Colombia. In these 
countries, femicide rates are 
anywhere from 7 to 12 per 100,000 
inhabitants. Except for Bolivia,  
all of the countries in question are 
characterized by high levels of lethal 
violence in general, as well as by  
the presence of organized criminal 
gangs and drug-trafficking 
organizations (DTOs).
Data from the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) confirm this trend. 
According to its latest report on 
global homicide, the countries of 
the northern triangle of Central 
America are among those with 
the highest female homicide rates, 
followed by Venezuela, Colombia, 
Mexico and Bolivia. In all of 
these countries, homicide rates 
for males are considerably higher 
than those for women. On average, 
the homicide rate for men in the 
Americas is 29.3, compared to 3.7 
for females. This difference is all the 
more striking in certain countries. 
According to UN and UNODC 
statistics, for example, the male 
homicide rate in Honduras in 2011 
was approximately 163 per 100,000; 
the female homicide rate for the 
same year was 11.4. In Guatemala, 
the homicide rate for men was 82.5 
per 100,000 in 2009, compared 
to approximately 9.8 per 100,000 
for women. These numbers are 
consistent with global trends:  
Across different countries and 
regions, lethal violence directly 
affects men at a much higher rate 
than it does women.
Despite its relatively lower rate 
of occurrence, however, female 
homicide has specific characteristics 
that make it a subject of special 
concern. According to the 
UNODC, 47% of female homicides 
around the world are committed 
by an intimate partner or family 
member. The percentage is lower in 
Latin America; in this region, only 
38% of femicides are perpetrated 
by a partner or family member. 
When broken down by country, the 
disparity is even more pronounced. 
For example, in Uruguay, a country 
with a relatively low homicide rate, 
the percentage of women victimized 
by a family member or an intimate 
partner is 58.5%. In contrast, 
in El Salvador-one of the most 
violent countries in the region- 
the number is as low as 4%. These 
figures suggest that, at least in 
certain countries, other dynamics 
beyond the domestic or private 
sphere are at play in the organization 
of violence.
The Politics of Femicide  
in Latin America 
by Gema Santamaría and María Huesca
R E P O R T S
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Patterns of femicide
The patterns of femicide in the 
region follow a range of logics and 
pose different challenges. Cases 
perpetrated by intimate partners and 
family members are more directly 
linked to traditional forms of 
domestic violence. According  
to a study by the Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO) 
covering 11 countries across the 
region, one in every 10 women 
reported being a victim of violence 
at the hands of an intimate partner 
at least once in her lifetime. This 
percentage is particularly high in 
some countries, including Bolivia 
and Peru, where more than 40% 
of women reported having been 
victimized by intimate partners. 
Research has shown that violence 
within the domestic sphere tends to 
escalate, going from psychological 
and physical forms of abuse 
to lethal violence. Due to the 
intricate dynamics of intimidation 
and economic and emotional 
dependence, violence within the 
domestic sphere is notoriously 
difficult to prevent, report  
and prosecute.
Femicides associated with 
organized crime and gang-related 
violence point to an increasing 
role for women as both victims 
and victimizers. In other words, 
killings by and of women in the 
public sphere reflect the growing 
recruitment and victimization of 
women by criminal organizations. 
They also expose the increasing 
participation of these groups in 
criminal activities such as human 
trafficking and sexual exploitation, 
which have a greater impact on 
women and girls. This is particularly 
true in Mexico, Colombia and 
the northern triangle of Central 
America. Criminal organizations 
such as Los Zetas reach beyond 
drug trafficking to the extortion SALVADOR MELÉNDEZ
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and exploitation of immigrants, 
including women. Prostitution 
and sex trafficking networks are 
active in Mexico’s southern border 
region and states along routes for 
Central American immigrants, 
such as Veracruz and Tamaulipas. 
Femicides in the public sphere are 
also a reflection of the militarized 
strategies adopted by Mexico and 
the countries of the northern 
triangle. Human rights reports 
point to an increase in human 
rights violations as a direct result of 
these policies. Killings of women 
have also increased, as have forced 
disappearances and torture.
Although private and public 
expressions of femicide are often 
considered in isolation, in practice 
they are connected in significant 
ways. For instance, the victimization 
of women by human trafficking and 
sexual exploitation networks often 
begins at home and can be directly 
connected to intimate partner 
violence. Partners or other family 
members typically recruit women 
for such networks by promising 
them a job in another city or 
country. This dynamic has been 
documented among Mexican and 
Central American female migrants 
who fall victim to forced labor, 
prostitution and sexual exploitation 
on their way to the United States. 
The same is true of women’s 
involvement in drug-trafficking 
organizations (DTOs). In Mexico, 
for instance, women often enter 
DTOs through filial or sentimental 
relationships. Due to the gendered 
dynamics of domination, women 
consistently occupy the lowest ranks 
within these criminal organizations, 
but the law disproportionately 
penalizes them. In countries as 
different as Chile, Peru, Argentina 
and El Salvador, more than half  
of female prison inmates are  
serving time for drug trafficking  
and possession, a statistic well  
above the percentage of male 
inmates doing time for  
similar offenses.
The politics of femicide
The political dimension of 
femicide in Latin America is mainly 
expressed by the actions and, even 
more so, the omissions of states 
in investigating, prosecuting and 
punishing women-related killings. 
While most Latin American 
countries have adopted specific 
policies or national plans to 
combat violence against women, 
these efforts remain chronically 
underfunded and suffer from a lack 
of coordination and articulation. 
This deficit in the state’s capacity 
to fully perform its role translates 
into neglect of the problem and 
impunity for the individuals and 
criminal organizations involved. In 
Guatemala, for example, 98% of 
femicides go unpunished, and in 
Honduras, the impunity rate has 
been calculated at 93.5%.
In many cases, the omissions go 
beyond institutional paralysis to 
active involvement by state actors 
in perpetuating violence against 
women. This is especially true 
in contexts where the state has 
increased the discretionary power 
of police and military personnel 
to combat crime. In Mexico, for 
instance, femicides have increased 
40% since 2006, the year the 
country officially launched its war 
on drugs. In Honduras, killings of 
women rose by more than 200% 
between 2002 and 2010, a period 
that coincides with the escalation of 
militarized anti-narcotics and anti-
gang policies.
The prevalence of femicide in 
the region cannot be understood 
in a vacuum. Rather, it should 
be viewed within a broader 
sociopolitical context characterized 
by gendered dynamics of exclusion 
and discrimination in the family, 
schools, economy and public sphere. 
Effective responses to femicide 
must address the institutional and 
social roots of the phenomenon. 
Evidence suggests that specialized 
and gender-sensitive police units 
can contribute to the reporting of 
intra-family or intimate partner 
violence. The creation of shelters 
with the support of civil society and 
grassroots organizations has also 
proven instrumental in providing 
immediate assistance and protection 
for the victims of domestic violence, 
sexual exploitation and human 
trafficking. Beyond these measures, 
policy responses need to address the 
victimization of women by criminal 
syndicates. To investigate and 
prosecute such crimes, governments 
will have to allocate additional 
resources beyond programs focused 
solely on prevention.
Either by their actions or their 
omissions, Latin American states 
have shown that they play a critical 
role in the perpetuation and 
persistence of femicide. Ni una más 
(not one more) and ni una menos 
(nor one less) have become rallying 
cries for civil society organizations 
and women’s movements across the 
region. To fulfill these pledges, states 
must acknowledge the political 
dimension of femicide and ensure 
justice is done for female victims 
and their families.
Gema Santamaría is a Nicaraguan-born 
historian who teaches in the Department 
of International Studies at Instituto 
Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
(ITAM). María Huesca is a senior in  
the International Relations program at  
the same institution.
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Victims and Perpetrators: 
Youth and Violence in Latin America
by José Miguel Cruz
Y outh bear the brunt of the wave of criminal violence affecting Latin America and the Caribbean. According to 
the 2013 Global Study on Homicide 
published by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, one in 
seven murder victims in the world 
is a young male aged 15-29 living 
in the Americas. Homicide rates for 
male youth in Latin America, widely 
considered the most violent region in 
the world, are more than four times 
the global average. In Honduras 
alone, the 2012 homicide rate for 
males 15-29 surpassed 280 per 
100,000. And in Brazil, the country 
with the most victims in the region, 
killings of youth 10-29 consistently 
account for more than 55% of all 
homicides in the country, according 
to data collected by Arturo Alvarado, 
a professor at the Colegio de México. 
Young people are conspicuous 
actors in regional criminal activities 
in general, especially in urban 
centers. Youth gangs rule the 
streets in a number of cities and 
impoverished communities across 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
In Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic and Venezuela, street gangs 
commonly recruit minors as young as 
11 years old. In the northern triangle 
of Central America (Guatemala, 
El Salvador and Honduras), where 
the so-called maras have expanded 
and openly challenged national 
governments, gangs compel aspiring 
members to murder people from 
rival territories just to be considered 
serious candidates for joining the 
organization. In Mexico, data 
collected by the Secretaría de 
Gobernación’s Victimization Survey 
found that 33.5% of murders 
committed in that country in  
2013 were perpetrated by youth  
aged 25 or younger. Violence is  
a tool not only of criminal 
syndicates, but also of self-directed 
youngsters reacting to the forces of 
exclusionary environments.
The impact of youth violence
It is impossible to understand the 
problems of crime and insecurity 
in the hemisphere without taking 
into account the participation of 
young people in the dynamics of 
violence, whether as its victims or 
perpetrators. Likewise, it is not 
possible to fully grasp the impact 
of criminal violence on a broad 
range of issues, from development 
to economic growth and political 
stability, without considering young 
people and their relationships with 
social and political institutions. The 
soaring levels of youths victimized, 
usually at the hands of their peers, 
have an outsized impact on Latin 
American societies. Youth-related 
violence not only increases the 
morbidity and mortality of a 
population otherwise characterized 
by its optimal health, but also affects 
economic productivity and limits 
the potential for innovation that 
young people represent. According 
to a recent report by the Inter-
American Development Bank, 
crime costs countries in the region 
an average of nearly 3.5% of GDP, 
with Honduras, El Salvador, Jamaica, 
and Brazil paying well above this 
level. Young populations victimized 
by violence add a disproportionate 
burden to health care systems and 
social services, while youth gangs 
and violent juveniles strain criminal 
justice systems and overcrowd prisons 
across the region. All of these issues 
divert government resources and 
private initiatives from development 
programs and productive activities. 
The impact of violence can also 
be seen in the region’s political 
climate. Latin American societies 
trapped in waves of violence are 
more inclined toward censorship 
and limit the public spaces where 
youth can create and thrive. They 
tend to empower institutions 
and actors with the potential to 
suppress tolerance, freedom and 
inventiveness. They are also more 
likely to scapegoat young people, 
especially the underprivileged, for 
many of the social ills affecting their 
communities. In some societies in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 
young people not only are the 
most frequent victims of violence 
and its most visible perpetrators, 
but are also portrayed as the main 
parties responsible for the violence, 
insecurity and social instability inside 
their troubled countries. As several 
studies have documented, such 
representations are largely shaped by 
political forces, part of social systems 
that keep disadvantaged youth 
16224_SIPA_LACC-Hemisphere Mag 2017.indd   22 7/25/17   12:47 PM
Hemisphere Volume 26 23
Reports
Victims and Perpetrators: 
Youth and Violence in Latin America
by José Miguel Cruz
away from political representation 
and decision-making processes. 
This is particularly evident in 
extremely unequal countries, where 
large masses of unemployed and 
impoverished young males are 
automatically labeled as a threat  
to stability.
In fact, a closer look at the 
dynamics of youth-related crime in 
countries experiencing significant 
outbreaks of violence suggests that 
this problem can be attributed 
at least in part to the failure of 
social and political institutions 
to incorporate young people into 
mainstream politics. In most 
countries of the region, social 
segregation of young people and 
the economic constraints they 
suffer are the result not of brazen 
discrimination or political repression, 
as was the case under the former 
military dictatorships, but instead  
of sustained processes of exclusion 
that permeate the institutions  
of socialization. Exclusion starts  
at home, is legitimized in the  
classroom and constantly reinforced 
in the community.
Research across the hemisphere 
—the United States included—has 
found a strong connection between 
criminal gangs, state-sponsored 
vigilante groups, and other violent 
organizations, on the one hand, 
and dysfunctional and abusive 
families, neglected and underfunded 
school districts, and derelict and 
underserved communities, on the 
other. Many youngsters transition 
into adulthood from the marginal 
edges of Latin America, where 
deprivation, despair and violence 
prevail. In the favelas of Brazil’s 
megacities, the villas miseria of 
Buenos Aires, and impoverished rural 
communities in Mexico and Central 
America, violent groups become the 
“natural” reference points for many 
children and young people.  
They turn to criminal activities  
and violence is the currency of choice 
in their daily relationships, even 
within the household and schools, 
because violence is the only skill 
they have learned and used in their 
immediate environments.
The political dimension
These problems and exclusionary 
dynamics are not new, but they have 
exploded across the region in the last 
few decades because of the failure 
of political establishments to reform 
institutions and enact policies that 
recognize and address the structural 
and demographic changes occurring 
in the wake of political transitions, 
the Washington Consensus and the 
information revolution. A number 
of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries experienced the peak 
of a youth bulge between 2005 
and 2015, significantly straining 
education systems, job markets and 
social services. Instead of channeling 
resources toward those areas, many 
governments resorted to draconian 
anti-crime policies and drug wars 
that defunded and debilitated the 
social institutions that nurtured 
and protected youth. The so-
called northern triangle of Central 
America is a case in point: Plagued 
by the highest crime rates in the 
world, Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras have consistently had 
some of the lowest rates of public 
social expenditure in the region, 
while their security budgets have 
substantially increased.
For many young people living in 
impoverished slums and neglected 
communities across the region, the 
societal transformations that sprang 
from cycles of political reforms have 
done very little to encourage a sense 
of opportunity and social mobility. 
Even the ambitious social programs 
implemented by the populist regimes 
that rose to power in the early 2000s 
failed to transform the dynamics of 
exclusion perpetuated by the key 
institutions of socialization. In many 
cases, governments coupled welfare 
policies with anxious discourses and 
violent campaigns against youth and 
the communities benefiting from  
public subsidies.
Ultimately, youth-related violence 
in Latin America and the Caribbean 
is as much a political challenge as it 
is a law enforcement or judicial one. 
In addition to the basic mechanisms 
of exclusion that perpetuate criminal 
violence, the problem is linked 
to political dynamics that seek to 
criminalize certain social groups 
for electoral gain. In Latin America 
and the Caribbean, young people 
between the ages of 15 and 29 
represent more than 25% of the 
population. As long as governments 
continue to ignore the systemic 
marginalization and victimization 
of their country’s youth, it will be 
impossible to address the high levels 
of violence in the region. To tackle 
criminal violence, Latin American 
societies not only need to enact 
policies that address the plights  
and concerns of young people,  
but also give them a voice in the 
political system.
José Miguel Cruz is a political scientist and 
the director of research at the Kimberly 
Green Latin American and Caribbean 
Center at Florida International University.
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Drug Trafficking and Violence  
in Latin America:  
Trends, Challenges and Lessons Learned
by Jonathan Rosen
L atin American countries have been afflicted by drug trafficking and organized crime for decades. Criminal 
organizations use violence to 
intimidate rival cartels, citizens, 
government officials and law 
enforcement. Yet government policies 
are also in part responsible for the 
high levels of violence. Iron fist 
(mano dura) strategies designed to 
combat organized crime throughout 
the region have led to spikes in 
violence in Colombia, Mexico, 
Brazil, El Salvador and various other 
countries. After passing mano dura 
and super mano dura programs to 
combat gangs in the early 2000s, 
for example, El Salvador surpassed 
Honduras as the most violent 
non-warring country in the world, 
with 104 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants in 2015.
The kingpin strategy 
One of the most common strategies 
Latin American governments have 
implemented to combat drug 
trafficking and organized crime 
is the so-called kingpin strategy, 
which holds that eliminating cartel 
leaders is the key to toppling drug 
trafficking organizations. In practice, 
the kingpin strategy can lead to more 
violence as rival cartels compete 
for control of territory and drug 
trafficking routes, and individuals 
within the organization jockey for 
power and leadership.
The case of Pablo Escobar, the 
ruthless leader of Colombia’s 
Medellín cartel in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, reveals the shortcomings 
of the kingpin strategy. Although 
the Medellín cartel collapsed after 
Escobar was killed in a firefight 
with the Colombian authorities 
in 1993, drug trafficking in this 
South American country continued 
unabated. In Mexico, too, the 
administration of President Felipe 
Calderón (2006-2012) focused on 
capturing the leaders of major drug 
trafficking organizations, charting its 
success by the number of top capos 
and drug shipments seized. However, 
drug violence proliferated during 
this government: During the six 
years of the Calderón administration, 
26,000 people disappeared and 
70,000 deaths were attributed to 
drug-related violence. Some sources 
put the death toll as high as 120,000. 
The violence has continued unabated 
under President Enrique Peña Nieto: 
During the first 45 months of his 
administration, 78,109 narco-
executions have been recorded, with 
some of the highest tolls in the states 
of Mexico (1,326), Guerrero (1,267) 
and Chihuahua (771).
One of the problems of the 
kingpin strategy, University of 
Miami Political Science Professor 
Bruce Bagley points out, is the 
fragmentation of drug cartels. The 
toppling of the Medellín and Cali 
cartels, for example, resulted in 
the emergence of 300 cartelitos. 
Mexico had six major drug 
trafficking organizations in 2006; 
by 2012, Attorney General Jesús 
Murillo Karam reported that the 
number had increased more than 
tenfold to between 60 and 80. 
The fragmentation of cartels into 
smaller organizations makes it even 
more difficult for the government 
to dismantle groups competing for 
control of drug routes, territory  
and markets.
The militarization of the  
war on drugs
The increasing violence in Latin 
America is intricately connected 
to the militarization of the war on 
drugs. In Mexico, President Calderón 
deployed the military to combat 
the increasing power and presence 
of drug cartels. By definition, the 
military should protect against 
external threats and enemies, while 
police forces are responsible for 
internal security. Calderón turned 
to the military because he did 
not have confidence in Mexico’s 
notoriously corrupt police. The 
newly militarized war against drug 
trafficking organizations, however, 
led to a dramatic increase in violence. 
The war fragmented criminal 
organizations, spurring territorial 
battles between different groups and 
against state institutions. From 2008 
to 2012, for example, Ciudad Júarez, 
just across the border from El Paso, 
Texas, was the most dangerous city in 
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the world due to the impact of  
drug trafficking and organized  
crime. Across Mexico, 123 journalists 
or media-support workers were  
killed between 2006 and 2015 
as drug traffickers and criminal 
organizations targeted politicians, 
human rights activists, journalists 
and other groups critical of  
their activities.
Other countries have also suffered 
from drug-related violence following 
a state’s decision to militarize the 
drug war. Various cities in Brazil have 
experienced spikes in violence as a 
result of organized crime groups such 
as First Capital Command (Primeiro 
Comando da Capital, or PCC) in São 
Paulo. In the northeast, Salvador, 
the capital of the state of Bahia, had 
a murder rate of 60 per 100,000 
in 2015, surpassing Rio de Janeiro 
(21.5 per 100,000).
On their own, drug trafficking  
and organized crime do not 
necessarily result in high levels 
of violence, but militarizing the 
drug war causes violence to spike. 
Critics of the tactic argue that the 
government is winning minor  
battles but losing the war.  
Leaders are captured and convicted, 
but the prisons they are sent to 
are plagued by overcrowding and 
function as schools of crime.  
Drug trafficking and other illicit 
activities continue behind prison 
walls, and countless escapes have 
occurred from prisons throughout 
Latin America. Militarization 
also does nothing to address the 
underlying problems in many 
countries, including high levels 
of corruption, inequality and 
unemployment. Ethan Nadelmann 
and Bruce Bagley argue that drugs 
are cheaper and more readily 
available today than ever before,  
an indication of the failure of  
supply-side strategies. Increasingly, 
many experts are arguing that  
drugs should be viewed as a health 
issue as opposed to a security 
problem. Drug trafficking will exist 
as long as there is demand for its 
product. Countries should spend 
fewer resources on combating 
the supply of drugs and more 
on treatment, rehabilitation and 
education, these experts maintain.
Other challenges
To effectively combat organized 
crime, drug trafficking and violence, 
governments need to address the 
deeper challenges that exist in their 
societies. Corruption and impunity 
are especially insidious problems 
in many Latin American countries. 
Impunity rates in Mexico and 
Venezuela, for instance, are as high  
as 99% and 98%, respectively. 
Néstor Humberto Martínez, the 
chief prosecutor of Colombia,  
has cited similar figures for his 
country. Instead of deploying 
the military to combat criminals, 
countries should focus on 
strengthening their institutions. 
Roberto Zepeda Martínez, a 
researcher at the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, 
stresses the need to combat the 
corruption and impunity that enable 
criminal organizations to bribe and 
intimidate government officials, 
politicians and security personnel.
In addition to corruption, 
countries throughout the region  
are plagued by inequality and  
various other socioeconomic 
challenges. Twenty million  
youths in Latin America are  
known as ninis because they  
neither work nor study (ni estudian, 
ni trabajan). Young people who 
lack educational and employment 
opportunities are vulnerable 
to joining drug trafficking 
organizations, which actively  
recruit them.
Lesson learned?
Many states in Latin America 
have long histories of conflict and 
structural violence. Drug trafficking 
and organized crime, as well as 
counternarcotic strategies, have 
played a role in escalating the 
problem. Addressing the violence 
will require governments to learn the 
lessons of past failures. Many leaders 
throughout the region, rejecting 
the cost of the drug war in terms 
of bloodshed, have called for a new 
paradigm. Alternative strategies 
are being debated, including 
decriminalization and legalization. 
While there are no magic solutions 
for ending structural violence 
in Latin America, the change in 
discourse over the past several years 
demonstrates that policymakers are 
at least looking for creative solutions. 
Some leaders, however, seem  
not to have learned from the failed 
policies of the drug war. Mauricio 
Macri, the president of Argentina 
since 2015, has reverted to hardline 
policies to combat drugs and 
crime in that country. While some 
governments are moving away from 
the failed paradigm of the drug 
war, others are continuing the same 
strategies. Drug-related violence will 
continue if successive administrations 
persist in implementing the same 
failed policies. 
Jonathan D. Rosen is an international 
studies specialist at the Jack D. Gordon 
Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship 
Studies at Florida International University.
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C riminal violence has been on the rise in the Americas in the last  15 years, despite efforts by the authorities 
to contain it by putting more 
offenders behind bars. With mass 
imprisonment failing to improve 
citizen security, governments need 
to consider a different approach 
to criminal justice. Instead of 
emphasizing incarceration as a 
response to insecurity, the focus 
should be on prevention,  
rethinking how to deal with  
crime, and strengthening the  
judicial system.
Pretrial detention and  
its implications
The incarceration rate in the 
Americas is high. Around the  
world, the average prison population 
rate is 144 per 100,000 inhabitants; 
in Latin America, it is 387. 
According to data collected by  
Roy Walmsley, approximately 110 
out of every 100,000 inhabitants 
in the Americas are in pretrial 
detention. These are people who 
are merely suspected of committing 
a crime and have yet to be proven 
guilty in a court of law. In the 
majority of the world’s countries, 
the pretrial rate is below 40; in the 
Americas, only three countries—
Aruba, Jamaica, and Nicaragua— 
are below that level, and 13 states 
have rates higher than 150 per 
100,000 inhabitants.
The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights points to a number 
of factors to explain the prevalence of 
pretrial detention the region. These 
include “issues of legal design,” such 
as compulsory pretrial detention 
for certain crimes; “structural 
deficiencies in the administration of 
justice systems” that interfere with 
judicial independence; and “deeply 
rooted [punitive] tendencies in 
judicial culture and practice.”
The situation is problematic for 
several reasons. First, it indicates 
an alarming lack of access to justice 
throughout the region. The right to 
liberty is fundamental and should 
only be restricted in exceptional 
circumstances. The fact that 39% 
of all people imprisoned in the 
Americas have not been convicted 
of any crime indicates a worrying 
disregard for that right. Second, 
research by the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime has found that high 
rates of pretrial detention tend to 
correlate with prison overcrowding. 
This is a considerable problem in the 
Americas, where prisons operate at 
more than 150% of their capacity in 
11 countries. Prison overcrowding 
compromises inmate safety and 
dignity, reducing the chances of 
rehabilitation and contributing to a 
vicious cycle of crime and violence. 
The importance of public policy
The good news is, we can change 
this reality. Studies have shown that 
public policy can have a substantial 
positive impact on criminal justice 
issues. The institutional reforms of 
the 1990s, for example, introduced 
the accusatory system in Latin 
America and strengthened due 
process guarantees with the effect 
of lowering the pretrial detention 
rate. A regional study by the Justice 
Center for the Americas showed that 
these gains have been at least partly 
undone following popular clamor 
for mano dura (iron fist) policies 
that favor incarceration and harsher 
punishments. The same study also  
found, however, that support for 
mano dura policies is stronger among  
people who perceive the state as weak. 
Strengthening public institutions, 
therefore, is central to efforts to chart 
a more constructive way of dealing 
with crime and violence.
To contain crime and violence, 
states need to develop initiatives 
aimed at prevention, including 
educational, employment and 
psychosocial support programs. Data 
collection, including where, when, 
and by whom crimes are committed, 
is essential to properly target and 
tailor such activities within countries 
and sub-regions. A connection also 
exists between a country’s level of 
economic development and citizen 
security, with lower-income countries 
tending to experience more violent 
crime than middle- or higher-income 
countries. Economic empowerment 
programs, therefore, could play  
a major role in preventing crime  
and violence.
Changing Course: 
Criminal Justice Reform  
in Latin America
by Mirte Postema
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Also essential are efforts to 
strengthen judicial institutions. Several 
studies have shown that the certainty 
of punishment, rather than the severity 
of sanctions, is the most effective 
deterrent. To achieve this effect, all 
actors in the justice system—police, 
prosecutors, courts, public defenders 
and the prison system—need to be 
more effective, efficient and respectful 
of human rights. The Guatemalan 
Public Ministry is an example of the 
progress that can be made in this 
regard. Starting in 2011, following 
a 2009 pilot project, the Ministry 
implemented a restructuring to 
provide integral attention to victims 
and identify patterns among cases. 
The new system created teams tasked 
with determining whether less severe 
or complex cases could be resolved 
using conciliation or alternative 
solutions, and sharing information 
across the Ministry and with other 
actors in the criminal justice system. 
Important strides were also made to 
professionalize the institution and 
defend its independence. Following 
these reforms, Ministry cases solved  
through alternative solutions increased  
exponentially, from 5,800 in 2008 to 
27,950 in 2013, and convictions more 
than doubled, from 3,280 in 2009 to 
7,122 in 2013.
The Guatemalan experience holds  
valuable lessons for other countries. 
Justice institutions can and should 
make the necessary efforts to 
professionalize their ranks via 
transparent and capacity-oriented 
hiring procedures. By introducing 
laws to govern justice sector careers, 
lawmakers can help guarantee the 
independence of justice operators, 
with oversight by autonomous 
administrative bodies. Better 
(digitalized) systems make it possible 
to share information within and across 
institutions and tap into advanced 
investigation methods to resolve 
complex cases.
Given the level of prison 
overcrowding in Latin America, 
governments need to be willing to 
consider unorthodox measures to 
create the conditions for structural 
reform. One such measure is 
the granting of partial pardons. 
According to the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, between 2008 and 2013, 
thirty US states lowered their 
imprisonment rates through such 
mechanisms as the commutation of 
sentences, and all saw reduced crime 
levels in the same period. In Italy, 
a study conducted by Francesco 
Drago and colleagues published 
in the Journal of Political Economy 
found that people whose sentences 
were commuted following passage of 
a bill that reduced prison sentences 
by three years were less likely to re-
offend than those whose convictions 
remained untouched. This practice 
has been tried in the Americas 
in Bolivia, which has granted 
presidential pardons and amnesties 
to nonviolent offenders for a number 
of years. Despite helping to reduce 
prison overcrowding, however, it has 
done nothing to reverse the country’s  
pretrial detention rates, which have 
continued to increase. 
Lastly, but perhaps most 
important, it is essential that societies 
as a whole rethink their approach to 
criminal justice. For example, the 
“war on drugs” has led to lengthy 
prison sentences for relatively minor 
drug offenses. As the Open Society 
Justice Initiative has made clear, 
mandatory pretrial detention for 
certain crimes overburdens the prison 
system and imposes enormous costs 
on suspects, their families and the 
state. In general, lengthy sentences 
make it harder to reintegrate into 
society. Interrogating current 
policies, therefore, is the most 
important first step in reforming the 
criminal justice and prison system.
Mirte Postema is a Dutch human rights 
specialist. She is a Fellow for Human 
Rights, Criminal Justice and Prison  
Reform in the Americas at Stanford  
Law School.
A man holds up a sign that reads in Spanish: “CICIG Yes” in reference to the U.N. International 
Commission Against Impunity, or CICIG, during a protest against Guatemala's President Otto 
Pérez Molina in Guatemala City on Monday, April 20, 2015. MOISES CASTILLO/AP Photo
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C rime has risen dramatically in Latin America over the last three decades. While levels vary 
among countries, most states in 
the region have higher crime rates 
today compared to the 1980s 
and ’90s. In response to public 
outcry and generalized perceptions 
of insecurity, governments have 
introduced tougher crime laws, 
leading in turn to a significant rise in 
the prison population. According to 
the International Center for Prison 
Studies, the region averaged 225 
inmates per 100,000 people in 2013, 
compared to 95 per 100,000 in the 
early 1990s. Today, more than two 
million people in Latin America are 
behind bars. If the trend continues, 
the prison population is estimated to 
reach four million by 2025.
The rise in incarceration, however, 
has not slowed the increase in crime. 
Some observers argue that without 
the tough policies, crime rates would 
be even higher, but this is impossible 
to prove. In the meantime, mass 
imprisonment has led to human 
suffering and exacted a high financial 
and social cost. An important 
question, therefore, is why Latin 
American prison systems have been 
unable to reduce crime and improve 
public security in the region.
Overcrowded and underfunded
Several authors, Andrés Antillano, 
Elías Carranza and Fernando Salla 
among them, have provided ample 
evidence of prison conditions in the 
region ranging from bad to atrocious. 
Most prisons are overpopulated; in 
many, water and food are scarce. 
Corruption is rampant in most 
systems, and rehabilitation programs 
are few, outdated and ill equipped to 
deal with the demands of reinsertion. 
In most countries, educational 
programs provide only elementary-
level instruction, and less than 
one-third of inmates attend classes 
regularly. The constitutional mandate 
of social rehabilitation has become 
an ambitious dream; instead, prisons 
have become schools of crime. Many 
first-time, nonviolent inmates exit 
prisons as professional and violent 
offenders already linked to criminal 
groups. The author’s own research in 
the region suggests that more than 
50% of inmates will re-offend, half 
of them within the first six months 
of leaving the system. 
Two interconnected processes 
contribute to an extensive 
list of shortcomings in the 
region’s penitentiary systems: 
first, insufficient investment in 
infrastructure and rehabilitation 
programs; and second, a doubling 
of the prison population in most 
countries in less than 15 years, 
outpacing generous budget 
allocations and brand new facilities. 
This disparity has contributed to 
a serious deterioration in prison 
conditions. New prisons rapidly 
become obsolete, corruption has 
been difficult to contain and, 
in countries such as Honduras, 
Venezuela and El Salvador, prison 
facilities have come under the 
control of gangs and other criminal 
organizations. Prison authorities  
in the region, for the most part,  
have had a hard time coping with 
mass incarceration.
Who are the inmates?
The prison population in the 
region can be classified in multiple 
ways. The first is by inmates’ legal 
status; in other words, whether they 
are in pretrial detention (PTD) or 
already sentenced. In most countries, 
half the prison population has PTD 
status, although this percentage 
has been changing as governments 
launch a concerted effort to speed 
up criminal procedures. These 
days, suspects are often expected to 
await trial outside prison unless a 
judge determines they pose a risk 
of evidence tampering or escape. 
According to available prison surveys, 
however, more than 95% of inmates 
are tried while they are already in jail.
The author’s research has found 
that approximately 40% of inmates 
in Latin American prisons are serving 
time for property crimes, most of 
them robberies that may include 
the use of violence. Between 20% 
and 25% of inmates are in jail for 
drug-related offenses, less than 20% 
for homicides, and between 15% 
and 20% for sex-related crimes, 
particularly rape. More than one-
Senseless Captivity: 
Prisons in Latin America
by Marcelo Bergman
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third of prisoners surveyed say they 
did not use violence in committing 
their offenses.
Most inmates in Latin America 
serve, on average, shorter sentences 
than in the United States. The 
average length is seven years, but 
longer sentences for homicides 
and sex crimes distort the average. 
Although mandatory sentencing has 
been extended in recent years, most 
inmates serving time for drug crimes 
and robberies are serving sentences 
that run anywhere from one to six 
years. As a consequence, the prison 
population in Latin America rotates 
rapidly. Half of inmates are released 
before they turn 30 years old, and a 
significant percentage goes back to 
crime soon after release from jail.
Females comprise 5% of the 
prison population, but their rate of 
incarceration has grown faster than 
the rate for males. Women serve time 
mainly for two types of felonies: 
homicides and drug-related crimes. 
The rise in the number of female 
inmates reflects their growing role in 
transporting drugs (as “mules”) and 
selling and delivering small quantities 
of illegal narcotics. For some women, 
particularly those heading single-
parent households, drugs have 
become a source of income, and 
in many countries in the region, 
preschool-aged children are allowed 
to live with their mothers in prison.
The burden on families
The incarceration of young 
males and heads of families puts an 
enormous stress on their households. 
Given the poor conditions in most 
prisons, many family members 
already living in disadvantaged 
environments must travel hours 
to provide their relatives with the 
basic needs prisons fail to furnish: 
clothes, sheets, shoes, medicine and 
even food. Most of all, incarceration 
of a breadwinner puts a significant 
stress on other family members to 
earn enough money to live. The 
imprisonment of a relative often 
means a heavy burden for members 
of the extended family, some of 
whom turn to crime themselves to 
supply basic needs for the prisoner 
and his or her kin. As children 
visit their fathers, brothers, uncles 
or mothers in prison, correctional 
institutions become familiar places, 
losing their deterrence effect. Every 
day in Latin America, more than 
two million children face the reality 
of having at least one close family 
member (a parent or sibling) in  
jail, and more than three million 
children have had a relative 
incarcerated during the last two 
years. No systematic studies have 
examined the effect familiarity 
with prisons has on future 
criminal behavior, but based on 
anthropological work, authors  
such as Javier Auyero and  
Maria Berti suggest the impact  
is significant.
A partial balance
Large-scale imprisonment has 
barely affected crime rates in the 
region. Robbery rates are high 
and growing, domestic illegal 
drug markets are expanding, and 
violence remains on the rise while 
more offenders are admitted to 
penitentiary systems. Latin American 
correctional facilities do not deter 
enough potential criminals and do 
not incapacitate enough offenders to 
reduce the incidence of crime. 
Why has doubling the prison 
population failed to reduce crime? 
Arguing that even more offenders 
need to be locked up is problematic, 
if only because resources and state 
capacities for running a penitentiary 
system are limited. Even in the 
United States, according to Alfred 
Blumstein and Joel Wallman, the 
effect of increased incarceration 
rates on reducing crime has been 
estimated at less than 10%. In short, 
putting more people behind bars 
does not produce a meaningful 
reduction in crime, and no country 
in the region has the resources to 
house a prison rate of 500 people  
per 100,000 inhabitants in  
decent facilities.
Prisons in Latin America have 
failed in two important ways: They 
do not deter, and they do not 
incapacitate. Large illegal economies 
breed the type of criminality that 
prisons are unable to curb or deter. 
Most of those arrested are small-time 
criminals: muggers, car thieves, drug 
dealers and drug mules, the last links 
in a long chain of illicit networks 
that are quickly replaced. As long as 
the market for stolen goods persists 
and demand for illegal drugs remains 
steady, large criminal organizations 
will have an incentive to recruit  
foot soldiers.
Marcelo Bergman is an Argentine 
sociologist. He is the director of the  
Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos  
sobre Inseguridad y Violencia (CELIV)  
at Universidad Nacional de Tres de  
Febrero in Argentina. 
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T here is no question that criminal violence in Latin America disproportionately affects the most 
vulnerable populations, but it 
also has a cost for Latin America’s 
business community and, in turn, 
the region’s economic potential. 
Alongside longstanding concerns 
regarding regulatory conditions, 
corruption and economic 
infrastructure, Latin America’s 
private sector consistently points 
to crime as one of the primary 
obstacles to doing business in the 
region. As early as 1997, World 
Bank surveys of firms around the 
world found that Latin American 
entrepreneurs most often cited crime 
as the main factor constraining 
their ability to do business. Two 
decades later, businesses in Latin 
America report the highest financial 
costs associated with crime, and an 
astounding two-thirds of the region’s 
firms pay for private security.
The toll criminal violence takes 
on the private sector reverberates 
throughout the region’s economies 
and societies. As Alejandro Gaviria 
has pointed out, the increased 
costs of doing business, coupled 
with declining sales in contexts 
of insecurity, can lead firms to 
reduce investment, stifling job 
creation and economic growth. 
The potential outcome is a vicious 
circle in a region that continues to 
exhibit exceptionally high levels of 
inequality as well as complex and 
worrisome dynamics of criminal 
violence, especially in countries, 
such as Brazil and Venezuela, 
that are experiencing economic 
downturns. Addressing these 
challenges will require continued 
research into the economic costs  
and consequences of crime.
The relationship between crime 
and the private sector also has 
repercussions in the political 
realm. As is clear from studies 
of phenomena as varied as 
authoritarianism, transitions to 
democracy, market reforms, taxation 
and public spending, the private 
sector is as much a political actor 
as it is an economic one. Scholars 
such as Elisabeth Jean Wood and 
Angelika Rettberg have shown that 
active business support for peace in 
civil war settings in Latin America 
has helped turn the tide of some of 
the region’s most violent conflicts, 
but we know considerably less 
about the role that Latin America’s 
business community plays in the 
politics of criminal violence; that 
is, the formal and informal political 
processes that shape its origins, 
dynamics and responses.
Businesses can play a role in 
providing the state with important 
resources to prevent and stem 
criminal violence. Lucy Conger 
documented how elite segments 
of the private sector in the 
Mexican state of Nuevo León gave 
government officials important 
financial, technical and human 
resources to support the creation 
of the Fuerza Civil, a new police 
unit designed to be more efficient 
and resistant to corruption than 
existing security forces. Another 
example is El Salvador, where 
large multinational firms have 
worked with the government 
to reincorporate former gang 
members into the labor force by 
providing them with skills training 
and employment opportunities. 
Methodologically rigorous and 
evidence-based evaluations of these 
and other similar cases may be able 
to tell us more about the efficacy of 
public-private sector coordination in 
this realm.
Focusing solely on the 
resources that business can offer 
such initiatives, however, risks 
overlooking a number of other 
important questions regarding 
the political dimensions and 
implications of the relationship 
between the private sector, criminal 
violence and the state in Latin 
America. These questions fall into 
three overarching categories: state-
business relations, business-criminal 
relations, and business resistance to 
criminal actors.
State-business relations
Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that collaboration between the 
public and private sectors can yield 
positive benefits in addressing 
criminal violence, but we need 
more comparative research into 
the scope and influence of such 
C O M M E N T A R I E S
The Private Sector, States and 
Crime in Latin America
by Eduardo Moncada
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partnerships. My own research has 
found that the nature of relations 
between the state and business is 
shaped in part by longstanding 
arrangements of governance that 
often predate contemporary waves 
of criminal violence and reflect a 
degree of overlap between political 
and economic interests. The public-
private relationship can range 
from collaborative to conflictive 
and includes intriguing variants 
in between, each of which poses 
unique opportunities and barriers 
to effective coordination on issues 
of criminal violence and the rule of 
law. On the one hand, collaborative 
relations lead to the sharing of 
critical resources and, more broadly, 
private sector endorsement of 
state projects to stem and prevent 
violence. Conflictive state-business 
relations, on the other hand, 
undermine similar policymaking 
efforts not only by denying resources 
to the state, but also by encouraging 
the private sector to support 
competing efforts to establish order, 
options that can include extra-
judicial violence and private militias. 
These relationships can vary across 
and even within cities—a dynamic 
that underscores the importance of 
subnational politics in a realm of 
scholarship and policymaking that 
has traditionally favored a national-
level focus.
Business-criminal relations 
We must also consider how the 
nebulous border between licit and 
illicit economies affects the potential 
for business to partner with the state 
to stem criminal violence. More 
research is needed on the linkages 
between business and criminal 
actors, a dynamic that can vary 
along a number of dimensions, 
including firm size, economic sector 
and place in the commodity chain. 
Different types of business, in other 
words, are likely to have different 
types of relationships with illicit 
economies and the criminal actors 
that coordinate them. Some of these 
relationships approximate structural 
fusions that make it difficult to 
disentangle licit from illicit interests. 
Others resemble arms-length 
relations characterized by predatory 
criminal behavior toward firms, 
including protection rackets and 
other forms of extortion. A better 
understanding of the variations 
in business-criminal relations 
could greatly inform the efforts of 
policymakers to help businesses 
address private security concerns and 
enlist their aid in broader initiatives 
aimed at advancing public order.
Business resistance to  
criminal violence
A closer look at attempts by 
businesses to resist the advances 
of criminal actors could also yield 
practical insights for potential 
policy interventions. During my 
research into protection rackets 
in Latin America, for example, I 
found that businesses use varied 
strategies to contest “taxation” by 
criminal actors. These strategies 
appear to vary depending on the 
degree to which firms engage in 
informal economic activities. Firms 
in the state-regulated formal sector 
are able to use their access to legal 
sources of capital and state actors 
to reject the advances of protection 
rackets and engage in public forms 
of resistance aimed at ending such 
practices. In contrast, informal firms 
whose activities are unregulated by 
the state and that lack legal access to 
capital often depend on protection 
rackets for financial support through 
short-term, high-interest loans. In 
other words, formal sector firms 
can count on the political and 
economic resources to resist criminal 
actors, while informal firms have a 
substantially lower capacity to do 
so. This suggests that policymakers 
should consider initiatives to 
improve the financial situation and 
boost the political involvement of 
Latin America’s substantial informal 
sector as a critical part of their 
efforts to stem the power of criminal 
groups. Attention to the criminal 
victimization of business should 
be balanced with more research on 
business mobilization to contest 
criminal actions.
Private sector support can play an 
important role in tackling persistent 
criminality and the growing power 
of criminal groups in Latin America. 
Enlisting the aid of the private 
sector, however, is as much about 
politics as it is about financial 
resources, job creation and technical 
knowledge. More research into the 
areas touched on above could help 
advance our understanding of the 
complex political dimensions of the 
relationship between the private 
sector, the state and crime in  
Latin America.
 
Eduardo Moncada is Assistant Professor  
in the Department of Political Science  
at Barnard College, Columbia University 
and the author of Cities, Business,  
and the Politics of Urban Violence in 
Latin America (Stanford University  
Press, 2016).
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New Forms of Crime and Violence 
in the Americas: 
Human Trafficking, Transnational Organized Crime and Migration 
in Central America and Mexico
by Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
T he involvement of transnational organized crime in the trafficking of undocumented 
migrants in transit from Central 
America to the United States is an 
important hemispheric problem 
that has not been well understood 
or studied appropriately to date. 
Many researchers and public officials 
interested in this phenomenon have 
relied on informants of dubious 
credibility and on informal sources 
that have not been properly verified 
or systematized. Migrant trafficking 
is a complex human problem 
that involves formal and informal 
transnational actors and generates 
billions of dollars in profits. The 
massacre of 72 migrants in San 
Fernando, Tamaulipas in 2010, 
and recently documented cases of 
sex and labor trafficking (including 
forced labor in criminal activities) 
allegedly involving transnational 
criminal organizations reveal the 
extent of the problem, expose 
serious limitations on the part of 
justice systems, and indicate the 
need for further research and action.
In the Western Hemisphere, the 
overlap between migration and 
organized crime is most visible in 
the northern triangle countries 
of Central America (Honduras, 
El Salvador and Guatemala) and 
along Mexico’s eastern migration 
Handprints and the Spanish word for “Liberty” mark slats of the US-Mexico border fence in Nogales, Mexico, Sunday, April 2, 2017.   
RODRIGO ABD/AP Photo
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routes from the main border cities 
in Tabasco and Chiapas (e.g., 
Tapachula and Tenosique) to the 
border of Tamaulipas with Texas. 
The most common and extensive 
human trafficking activities in the 
northern triangle countries are 
forced prostitution and compulsory 
labor for criminal gangs, especially 
Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha 
(MS-13). These gangs operate 
transnationally, but their levels of 
organization and the threat they 
represent are much less significant 
outside of Central America, and 
they do not seem to participate in 
migrant smuggling activities on a 
large scale within Mexican territory.
Three central Mexican states 
(State of Mexico, Tlaxcala and 
Puebla), the southern state of 
Chiapas, and Mexico City report 
the highest incidences of human 
trafficking. These types of crimes 
have increased exponentially in the 
past seven years-more than 600%, 
according to statistics from the 
Attorney General’s Office (PGR)-
and are concentrated mainly along 
the country’s borders. In the south, 
the largest forced prostitution node 
is the city of Tapachula, Chiapas. 
The majority of the victims are 
minors, mostly poor migrant 
girls from Guatemala, Honduras 
and El Salvador. The state of 
Chiapas’s special prosecutor’s office 
investigated 68 cases of human 
trafficking from 2008 through May 
31, 2015, most of them involving 
sex trafficking. Despite these 
investigations, NGOs and human 
rights defenders report serious 
limitations in the justice system and 
law enforcement, mainly at the state 
and local levels. All too often, they 
claim, undocumented migrants in 
vulnerable situations and victims 
of labor exploitation are the ones 
arrested and charged, not the actual 
traffickers. These allegations can 
be verified by examining prison 
files and the testimony of detainees 
who have been presumed guilty in 
advance of any due process.
A second common form of 
migrant trafficking along Mexico’s 
eastern migration routes is forced 
labor for criminal activities. 
Typically, transnational criminal 
organizations, mostly drug cartels, 
compel hapless migrants to engage 
in activities such as the production, 
transport and sale of illicit 
drugs; violence or killing for hire 
(sicariato); and surveillance for their 
organizations (halconaje). Other 
aspects of the problem include 
migrant smuggling and kidnappings 
for ransom. The main groups 
involved in these activities in eastern 
Mexico include Los Zetas, the Gulf 
Cartel and, more recently, the Jalisco 
New Generation Cartel (Cartel 
Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG) 
in Veracruz. Most of the victims are 
young Central American men and 
Mexican deportees, recruited  
mainly in Mexico’s northeastern 
border region.
The practice of compelling 
migrants to work for criminal 
organizations was especially 
prevalent during the most violent 
period of Mexico’s drug war, from 
2010 through early 2013. During 
this period, the cartels forced many 
migrants to commit acts of violence 
and even murder. The areas most 
affected included the southern 
border city of Tenosique, Tabasco; 
Saltillo, Torreón and Piedras 
Negras, Coahuila; the main cities of 
Veracruz (including Coatzacoalcos, 
the city of Veracruz and Boca 
del Río); and the entire state of 
Tamaulipas. Today, forced labor for 
criminal activities in Mexico takes 
place mainly in the Tamaulipas 
border cities of Reynosa, Matamoros 
and Nuevo Laredo; the Tamaulipas 
state capital, Ciudad Victoria; 
Piedras Negras, Coahuila; and the 
state of Veracruz. All suffer from 
rampant corruption and deficient 
law enforcement, with numerous 
allegations of close links between 
local and state law enforcement 
agencies and organized crime.
The current security crisis in 
Mexico and Central America, a 
weak rule of law, high levels of 
corruption, and the limitations 
of Mexican legislation make the 
problem of migrant trafficking 
in the region even more acute. 
At its root are the massive forced 
displacements of Central Americans 
escaping violence and extreme 
poverty in their countries. Sex and 
labor trafficking, with the alleged 
involvement of transnational 
criminal organizations, is intimately 
linked to migrant smuggling. 
All of the manifestations of this 
problem underscore the limits of 
the region’s justice systems and the 
need for further research to help us 
understand these connections.
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera is Associate 
Professor of Public Affairs and Security 
Studies at the University of Texas Rio 
Grande Valley (UTRGV). The information 
for this piece comes from a project that  
was funded through a research grant from 
the United States Department of State 
Trafficking in Persons Office (J/TIP) 
and should not be reproduced or copied 
without permission. The contents are the 
responsibility of the researcher and do  
not necessarily reflect the views of  
the Department of State or the  
United States government.
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On the Difficulties of Representation: 
Women in Gangs in  
Latin America
by María Santacruz Giralt
Female inmates attend a mass marking one hundred days since a peace agreement was reached among gang members at the women’s prison of Ilopango 
in San Salvador, El Salvador, Tuesday, June 26, 2012. LUIS ROMERO/AP Photo
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In the late nineteenth  century, the field of criminology paid little attention to offenses committed by women. If the 
topic was considered at all, it was 
marginalized, pathologized and 
(hetero) sexualized. Male scientists 
and, later, criminologists and 
doctors, largely defined women 
by contrasting their “dangerous, 
disruptive subjectivities” with 
the “rational and reliable” male 
mind. As a result, many scientific 
disciplines, including psychiatry 
and criminology, became important 
drivers in the production of a 
normative femininity as the context 
for explaining female crime. 
For years, the incursion of  
girls and women into “outlaw 
spaces” was explained as the 
manifestation of individual 
maladjustments, psychiatric 
disorders or moral deviations.  
Well into the twentieth century,  
girls and women who strayed from 
the law and, with it, the standard  
of the “feminine-normative woman” 
occupied a unique place in the 
taxonomy of deviation. Even today, 
women are automatically thought 
of as the victims of or bystanders to 
violence, not as its agents. It comes 
as a shock to imagine a female 
taking a life rather than creating  
and nurturing it.
Given the persistence of such 
assumptions, criminal transgression 
is still widely understood as an 
eminently masculine phenomenon. 
An example is the issue of female 
involvement in gangs in Latin 
America, especially in El Salvador, 
where these criminal organizations 
are a major social problem.  
Research on the roles girls and 
women play in gangs is a neglected 
topic, or at least a marginal one  
in comparison with the work 
that has been done on male gang 
members. Three related issues  
are responsible for this neglect:  
first, the development and 
complexity of the gang 
phenomenon in Central America; 
second, traditional approaches to 
transgression and violence; and 
third, women’s minority status 
within gangs themselves.
Research on gangs has struggled 
to keep up with the rapid changes 
this phenomenon has experienced 
in the past decade, including the 
growing links between organized 
crime and delinquency, the impact 
of state policies and, most recently, 
ties and negotiations with state 
agents. The bulk of study has 
targeted the main actors in these 
spaces (the “homeboys”), with 
women’s involvement ranking as 
an incidental or, at best, secondary 
concern. This paucity of inquiry 
about women’s agency is explained 
not only by the gender gap (the 
lower female delinquency rate 
compared to men), but also,  
and more importantly, by the  
way society represents women.
As many contemporary  
female authors have observed,  
much of the research on women 
as violent actors follows an agenda 
shaped by traditional, universalist, 
reductionist and/or sexualized 
representations of “women.”  
This is an agenda that conceives 
of women as the objects (sufferers, 
victims) or witnesses (spectators, 
scholars) of violence, not its subjects 
(perpetrators, agents). The issue  
of women in gangs is a complex  
and sensitive subject because 
women’s regime of action is 
complex. Their transgressions 
are not only criminal but also 
social, because they disrupt the 
conventional link between women 
and violence.
Women have minority status 
within gangs, not only in terms 
of numbers but also because of a 
qualitative imbalance. Salvadoran 
gang dynamics, representations 
and group practices engender and 
are produced by the implicit and 
explicit codes, values and rules 
of a violent masculinity. Gangs 
are spaces configured by practices 
linked to the cultural meanings 
by which members represent 
themselves collectively, construct 
their subjectivities and understand 
the “world of the masculine” on 
close terms with violence. Gangs 
are spaces that reproduce at a 
micro-level, in an extreme way, 
representations, stereotypes and 
asymmetries prevalent in  
Salvadoran society. In those worlds, 
the center of daily life is marked by 
excessive violence.
Women constitute a collective 
subject in a larger dynamic centered 
on the active exercise of a violent 
masculinity that requires them to 
join in as “one of the guys,” but at 
the same time they are conditioned 
by their “womanhood” inside and 
outside of the gang. Much of the 
trouble in analyzing this dynamic 
stems from the difficulty of focusing 
on the complex agency of a 
particular type of research subject/
object. In other words, violent 
acts on the part of women within 
criminal gangs break the logic of 
society’s ascribed role for women.
María Santacruz Giralt is a Salvadoran 
sociologist. She is an instructor at the 
Universidad Centroamericana in  
San Salvador.
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Brazil, along with Jamaica and, more recently, some Central American countries, is one of the places in the world 
where the police are most known 
for using lethal force. According to 
official data released by the Forum 
Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, a 
total of 3,022 people lost their lives 
as a result of police interventions 
in 2014. This figure, necessarily 
an underestimation of the real 
phenomenon, is already equal to 
a rate of 1.5 police killings per 
100,000 inhabitants, higher than 
the overall homicide rate in many 
other countries. It also marked a 
37% increase from the previous 
year. The national rate hides stark 
regional differences, with states 
such as Rio de Janeiro, Alagoas and 
São Paulo facing a far more acute 
problem. Brazilian police officers in 
turn are subject to disproportionate 
violence: 398 of them were killed 
in 2014, most of them in the same 
states mentioned above. The main 
difference is that while officers kill 
most suspects while on duty, the 
majority of law enforcement agents 
are killed off duty as a result of 
private conflicts, while resisting a 
robbery, or simply because they are 
recognized as police officers.
The profile of a victim of police 
killings is the same as that of the 
typical homicide victim: a young 
black male who lives on the urban 
periphery. Research in Rio de 
Janeiro shows that the probability 
of being killed (as opposed to 
being wounded) in a shootout with 
the police is approximately 8% 
higher if the suspect is black. This 
discrepancy holds true both inside 
and outside the favelas (slums). 
Police killings in Brazil, in contrast 
to those in the US, are more often 
debated along the lines of class or 
territory rather than race.
Beyond the high incidence 
of police violence, the pressing 
question is whether the use of 
such force is justified or excessive. 
Given the notorious inability of the 
Brazilian criminal justice system 
to investigate police killings and 
separate legitimate from abusive 
police actions, analysts often resort 
to global indices of police use of 
force. The most common ones are 
the lethality index (the number of 
dead suspects divided by wounded 
suspects); the ratio of suspects killed 
to law enforcement officers killed; 
and the proportion of all homicides 
that result from police action. 
Regardless of the index used, the 
figures reveal the excessive use of 
force and the practice of summary 
executions in several Brazilian states, 
confirming the conclusions of many 
human rights reports.
The roots of this excess in the use 
of lethal force are manifold. The 
first obvious one is the existence of 
particularly violent types of criminal 
behavior. In Rio de Janeiro, for 
example, drug-dealing gangs control 
the slums with assault rifles and 
dispute their territories with each 
other and the police.
The second factor is the prevalence 
of a “warrior ethos” among police 
officers, who see their mission as 
a war against crime rather than 
protecting the civilian population, 
to the point that innocent victims  
of the crossfire are viewed as 
collateral damage.
Third, significant sectors of 
the population support punitive 
policing out of a belief that violence 
is the only way to fight crime given 
the weakness of Brazil’s criminal 
justice system. A survey of the 
general population in 2010 revealed 
that 44% of Brazilians agreed 
that “a good criminal is a dead 
criminal.” Recent research shows 
that many people support summary 
executions even though they do not 
trust the police or their capacity to 
distinguish between criminals and 
law-abiding citizens, as revealed by 
several notorious cases of “police 
mistakes” that resulted in deaths.
Fourth, Brazil lacks proper 
internal and external controls 
on police use of force. The Civil 
Police (which plays an investigative 
role), the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and the Judiciary have all 
neglected their duty to investigate 
cases of police killings and punish 
abuses. In an already overburdened 
criminal justice system, little 
attention is spared for murders 
where evidence is scarce, witnesses 
are terrified, and prosecution 
of law enforcement agents is 
unpopular among broad sectors 
of the population. Indeed, legal 
“A Good Criminal is a Dead 
Criminal”: Police Killings in Brazil
by Ignacio Cano
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transference of the responsibility for 
killings committed by the military 
police from the military courts to 
civilian jurisdiction in 1997 did 
not translate into a significantly 
higher number of prosecutions or 
sentences against police officers 
involved in summary executions. 
Internal controls also tend to be lax 
and not focused on the use of force. 
Until recently, the military police in 
Rio, for example, could not account 
for the number of bullets shot by 
each officer, even though the figure 
reached the hundreds in some cases. 
The military police in São Paulo in 
the 1990s and in Rio more recently 
introduced internal programs to 
monitor the use of force, but results 
have been limited.
Poor police training and the 
lack of a clear official policy are 
additional factors that explain  
the use of excessive force. Some 
officers are uncertain when and how 
to use force: Many genuinely believe 
they could be prosecuted just for 
trying to defend themselves, whereas 
others think it is legal to shoot a 
fleeing suspect. In addition, the 
availability of non-lethal weapons  
is not guaranteed.
Finally, police officers lead a 
stressful life and are commonly 
exposed to violence, to which 
they tend to respond with more 
violence. Recent research in 
Rio suggests that factors such as 
witnessing other colleagues being 
shot, or experiencing violence in 
adolescence, are associated  
with the increased use of force, 
as are institutional incentives to 
interdict drugs.
Once all of these factors are added 
up, perhaps the real question is why 
the number of civilians and police 
officers who murder each other in 
Brazil every year isn’t higher.
Ignacio Cano is a Spanish sociologist.  
He is the coordinator of the Laboratory for 
the Analysis of Violence (LAV) at the State 
University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ).
People reenact a killing during an August 22, 2014 march through the Manguinhos favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to protest police killings of blacks. 
Every year, Brazil ’s police are responsible for around 2,000 deaths, one of the highest rates in the world. Many of the deaths in Rio involve blacks killed 
in favelas. MARIO TAMA/Getty Images
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“We Are Marked by Its Signs”: 
The Pull of Gang Life in  
Central America
In 2016, the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center, in partnership with Florida International University’s 
Jack Gordon Institute for Public 
Policy and El Salvador’s Fundación 
Nacional para el Desarrollo, carried 
out a research project to understand 
the phenomenon of gangs in that 
Central American country, home to 
some of the most violent criminal 
organizations in the region. The 
research team conducted interviews 
with more than 1,200 active and 
former gang members (pandilleros) 
in jails, prisons, rehab programs 
and juvenile correction centers. 
These conversations, excerpts of 
which appear below, shed light on 
such topics as the context of gang 
violence in El Salvador; what kind of 
people tend to be recruited and why; 
and how feasible it is for members 
to leave gang life, as well as the role 
society can play in facilitating this 
decision. More information about 
the research, the sponsor institution, 
and the ethical procedures followed 
to protect interview respondents 
are available at https://lacc.fiu.edu/
research/the-new-face-of-street-
gangs-in-central-america/.
Interviewer: Why do young people 
join gangs in El Salvador?
Pandillero 2: 
First of all, the unemployment. 
Lack of opportunities. The situation 
in the country is really bad. For 
example, I was not involved in 
anything wrong before… But 
they [the police] see you talking 
to the guys [the gang] and harass 
you, think that you are with 
them. And you react by deciding 
to join the gang. You feel anger. I 
remember once a boy was killed in 
my neighborhood; I wasn’t a gang 
member yet, but I felt anger at how 
he was murdered. And that is what 
motivated me to become a member. 
Obviously, it isn’t good what they 
do, but violence generates more 
violence. Here, if you kill one gang 
member, three new ones join. Gangs 
are not good but they gain power by 
recruiting young people. Remember, 
gangs are considered to be cool/
fashionable. The gang attracts 
members because it is popular. The 
more the police put the pressure on, 
the more angry people get.
Pandillero 13:
In my case, I liked the gangs. Ever 
since I was young, I liked their 
tattoos, their music; I liked to see 
how girls approached them [gang 
members]… like they were popular. 
However, in many cases, people 
don’t join gangs voluntarily, but 
because they are forced to. Often 
people join to defend someone else 
or themselves, or their family... 
Your brother or sister may have 
had problems with some gang, and 
so you join another one to protect 
them. You could say that here in El 
Salvador, if you are not a member of 
the police, you are a gang member.  
It’s just that simple: There is always 
someone in your family or among 
your friends with links to the gangs.
Pandillero 15:  
[People join the gang] because they 
often do not have any options. They 
view it as something natural. Young 
people want to feel important, 
to feel accepted, to be part of 
something. In this sense, gangs are 
often more receptive toward young 
people. They attract them, tempt 
them. They are better at this than 
many other organizations.
Pandillero 7:
Many young people become 
involved with gangs because of 
a lack of love from their parents. 
Some get involved because they 
want more respect.
Interviewer: Describe “respect.”
Pandillero 7:
If I’m in the gang, nobody will argue 
with me; nobody will be able to 
harm me. If they touch me, they’re 
gonna have problems. Basically, it’s 
based on fear.
Interviewer: Do you think the  
gangs have a clear goal? If so, what  
is their goal?
Pandillero 12:
The main goal of the gang is to 
dominate a territory. To control it. 
Remember, many gang members 
have a lot of resentment. They 
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have been humiliated, and so their 
purpose is to dominate in some 
form. What they want is power.
Interviewer: What kind of power do 
gang members want? Economic, social 
or political?
Pandillero 12:
I would say both economic 
and social. Young people often 
rebel during adolescence. They 
seek attention. But this type of 
rebellion is different: It is caused 
by emptiness. It reflects a lack 
of appreciation and love. [Gang 
members] aren’t violent without a 
reason; the vacuum in their lives 
manifests itself through violence. 
Regarding economic power, gang 
members just want to come out of 
poverty. Poverty is the main reason. 
One of my friends used to tell me: 
‘let’s jump in [join the gang], we are 
gonna have money, we are gonna 
have what our parents don’t give us.’
Interviewer: Did you find these 
things in the gang?
Pandillero 12:
No. I partly found respect, social 
recognition, but not always. In 
terms of economic power, I didn’t 
get what I expected.
Interviewer: What did the gang give 
you, then?
Pandillero 12:
You could say power. In the sense 
that if someone looked at me the 
wrong way, because I was with the 
gang I could take him out. I even 
got a weapon. A homemade one, 
but still—I felt powerful with it. I 
knew that I could intimidate anyone 
who crossed me.
Interviewer: What is it that attracts 
young people most to gangs vs. other 
social organizations?
Pandillero 15:
It can be many things, but mostly, 
young people are attracted by the 
possibility of finding an identity. 
Teenagers often lack identity; the 
gang gives it to them, to the point 
that it even gives them new names.
Interviewer: What is the main 
purpose of the gangs?
Pandillero 15:
At some point, the gangs did not 
have a purpose. Before, they might 
have served as a tool for self-defense 
or a secure place. Over time, they 
have acquired a purpose. Nowadays, 
the main goal of gangs is economic, 
to get revenue. A sense of identity, 
of being notorious, may be there, 
too, but it’s not the main purpose.
Pandillero 16:
To recruit more members, especially 
young ones. They look for kids 
who are, like, 8 years old… In my 
neighborhood, for example, there 
are 5- or 6-year-old kids who are 
already beginning…and it’s a pity 
because they may already carry a 
pistol. You can see an 8-year-old 
firing a pistol. The gang sees they 
are kids and takes advantage of their 
innocence. They are not looking for 
adults, just youngsters.
Pandillero 2: There is an order. The 
gang always has an objective: to 
control, to gain territory, so that all 
of El Salvador belongs to one gang. 
That is when the homicides will 
stop. Controlling a territory allows 
them to develop criminal activities 
calmly, to extort…
Interviewer: Can [the gang] problem 
be solved in the next 10 years?
Pandillero 2:
It is hard. There is no solution. 
The only solution should address 
the roots of the problem. I do not 
think the gangs will disappear. They 
are becoming stronger, gaining 
more power. Inside the prison, 
the situation is really bad. The 
government mistreats the inmates. 
So many people want to change, 
but they have no opportunities. I 
spent 10 months in prison and the 
situation is critical. In the state of 
emergency now we have no water…
we could spend 20 days without 
water…the food is often inedible. 
This is repression. And the more 
repression the gangs feel, the more 
anger and hatred it creates.
Pandillero 18:
We need preventive programs 
against violence that would provide 
young people with recreational 
activities. We need to take young 
people into account, teach them 
and give them ways to occupy their 
free time, because that’s precisely 
when gangs target them most. Of 
course, I don’t think they should 
be given anything they want, but 
they also have rights under the law. 
If someone is beaten they will react 
differently. We all have opportunities 
to change, but if the violence comes 
from the government, the response 
from youth will be worse. Look at 
the prisons: There are sick inmates 
there who need help. But instead, 
they are kept isolated… If the law 
changed a little bit, it could reduce 
the levels of violence.
Interviewer: What conditions are 
necessary for a gang member to leave 
a gang?
Pandillero 13:
There is no such thing as leaving  
the gang. You may not have  
noticed, but I have tattoos on  
my body. We are not there anymore 
but, in a certain way, the group 
considers us to still be a part of it 
because we are marked by its  
signs. You can “calm down” [no 
longer participate in gang life 
and the activities of the gang 
organization], but not leave the 
gang. Nobody can leave the gang. 
The only way to find light is 
through God.
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Pandillero 11: 
Spiritual change. Only God can 
change a person… To calm down, 
you have to have been in a gang 
for a while; that is, if a member has 
done enough for the gang and has a 
good rank, he can get a pass to calm 
down. Otherwise, it’s a lie, unless 
you become a Christian. Calming 
down is still like being active. I’ve 
known people who calmed down 
at first and then were active again 
because they don’t have God in  
their heart.
Pandillero 15:
Actually, the gangs make you swear 
an oath of loyalty until death. There 
have been cases of people who 
calm down; they walk away from 
the gang for various reasons, such 
as having a family. They stop their 
illicit activities, sometimes they 
move…but these are very isolated 
cases. The possibility is stronger if a 
young gang member finds a new ID, 
a new lifestyle, a 360° turn in life, 
something that changes him. But 
he can’t keep on committing crimes 
outside the gang; this would cause 
Alleged members of the 18th Street Gang are presented to the press in San Salvador, El Salvador on February 26, 2016. Over the course of three days, members of 
the national civil police and the armed forces captured 240 gang members accused of homicide and extortion. MARVIN RECINOS/AFP/Getty Images
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discontent in the gang. So, if he says 
he will change his life, the change 
must be radical, otherwise the gang 
won’t accept it.
Interviewer: On a personal level, what 
does someone need to leave the gang?
Pandillero 6: 
They need to have a way to occupy 
their time and know that their life is 
worth something. In the gang, you 
fall into a life of vice, alcohol, drugs, 
violence…You basically waste your 
life. You don’t value it. Some people 
even kill themselves because their 
conscience won’t leave them alone. 
My conscience was chasing me, and 
that’s why I started drinking a lot. 
…Many people can’t live with what 
they have done. Gang members 
know that what they are doing is 
wrong. I left because I was told 
the gang [a rival gang] went to my 
house to shoot it up. I knew that 
I’d be killed someday. My mom was 
selling pupusas outside our house 
with my brother and sister. A car 
stopped and the people in the car 
started to fire at them. My sister 
was injured, and my mother and 
my brother were shot as well. And 
an 8-year-old kid, who was just 
eating pupusas, died right there… 
My friends came and told that they 
had come to my place, harmed my 
family, and that we were going to 
avenge ourselves. I said to God: 
just give me one more chance. 
And I told myself from my heart: 
If I go [looking for revenge], first, 
they could kill me….Second, the 
police could catch me and I could 
be incarcerated for 30 years…And 
third, even worse, they could come 
back and kill someone in my family. 
They had already injured them…. 
So, I told my brother: if you want 
to, go ahead. I’m done; I’m not 
going anywhere. And my brother 
told me, “then I’m done, too. I’m 
here [in the gang] only because of 
you, to protect you.”
Interviewer: What are the challenges 
people face once they leave the gang?
Pandillero 23: 
Your family is the major challenge, 
because your family knows you best. 
I did not grow up with my mother. 
She just left me in the neighborhood 
and went away. After my brother 
was murdered, she told me that I 
was dead to her, too, and that I was 
never going to change. It’s a huge 
challenge when your own mom, 
who had you, who is supposed to 
love you unconditionally, tells you 
this kind of thing. In my case, I can’t 
say that I love her. She was never 
there for me; I’ve never known her 
love. And this was a major obstacle  
—that after all I had lost, when I 
really wanted to recover and change, 
she reacted like this. I felt that it 
made things worse…
Pandillero 8: 
The main problem is non-
acceptance. Because in the eyes 
of society, a gang member never 
changes. We feel excluded and it’s 
really bad, because some of us have 
families, kids, we want to work... 
Sometimes, job positions require 
a high school degree. (In my case, 
thank God, I have a high school 
degree). Or you can be rejected 
because of a tattoo or because of 
your past. Tattoos are art in other 
places. Here, tattoos are associated 
with gang members.
Pandillero 13:
The discrimination. Even though 
I’m a Christian now, the police keep 
pursuing me anyway. The police 
play a big role in the fact that many 
people who want to change cannot. 
People who want to leave the gang 
need a helping hand; they need 
someone to help them. But this 
hand does not exist.
Compiled by José Miguel Cruz,  
a political scientist and director of  
research at the Kimberly Green Latin 
American and Caribbean Center at 
Florida International University.
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Everlasting
by Donna DeCesare
P H O T O  E S S A Y
Moravia barrio,  
Medellín, Colombia, 2001
Like most of Medellín᾽s barrios,  
this one is controlled by gangs.
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2001
Medellín, 
Colombia, 2001
The funeral for a youth from the “comunas”who was 
murdered in clashes between 
gangs and armed groups over control of 
profits from extorting the bus routes.
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2001
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El Carmen de Bolívar,  
Colombia, 2005
Survivors of the El Salado Massacre, these orphaned children are  
now displaced and living in El Carmen. They receive support from  
“Women Life and Future,” an NGO that helps victims of the conflict.  
Since the paramilitary groups who perpetrated the massacre demobilized,  
the killers have immunity and have been living in the same region as their 
former victims. 
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2005
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Guatemala City, 
Guatemala, 2001
A crowd gathers at a 
crime scene following a 
gang-related homicide. 
Copyright © 
Donna DeCesare, 2001
Villavicencio, 
Colombia, 2007
Mariela Duarte, widow of human 
rights lawyer Josue Giraldo, is raising 
her two daughters alone. Mariela 
lives a very private life but wants the 
memory of her murdered husband 
to be honored. “Josue was a generous 
person who always helped others. He 
was transparent in everything he did 
and deserves transparency about his 
life and the way he died.”
Copyright © 
Donna DeCesare, 2007
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Guatemala City,  
Guatemala, 2005
At the Verbena cemetery, a youth 
weeps inconsolably for an older 
boy who had been like a father to 
him. The murdered youth had been 
involved with gangs but recently  
became an evangelical Christian and 
supported himself by selling candy 
on the buses downtown. He was 
murdered in broad daylight in  
Zone 1 in what some allege was 
a revenge gang killing based on 
mistaken identity. 
Copyright ©  
Donna DeCesare, 2005
Guatemala City,  
Guatemala, 2001
Cindy, a 16-year-old prostitute, 
struggles to earn money to support 
her two-year-old son. She hopes to 
leave this life and fears having her 
face shown. Many of the women in 
this gang-controlled red light district 
are trafficked from other Central 
American countries.
Copyright ©  
Donna DeCesare, 2001
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Guatemala City, 
Guatemala, 2005
Elcira González Pérez, 41, pictured 
with her daughter, Dalia Susena 
Alvarado González 15, holds a 
portrait and the 6th-grade diploma 
of her daughter, Fabiola Alvarado 
González, who died of HIV-related 
illness in 1999 at age 12.
Elcira González became an HIV 
and women’s rights activists when 
she discovered that her 9-year-old 
daughter had been sexually abused 
by her husband (the child's own 
father) and that he had been offering 
her to his friends for money. She 
fought to have her ex-husband 
and all of the men who raped her 
daughter incarcerated. The case 
received widespread press coverage, 
but instead of gaining her sympathy 
the publicity caused the family to 
suffer tremendous stigma. Schools 
rejected her daughter, neighbors 
taunted them and they were forced 
to move many times. Despite 
the stigma, Elcira and Dalia 
continue their work as activists.
Copyright © 
Donna DeCesare, 2001
Guatemala City, 
Guatemala, 2001
Rosario (an alias for her protection) 
is now 19 years old. She was raped 
by Guatemalan policemen when 
she was 15. After she received death 
threats for speaking out, Casa 
Alianza provided her refuge and 
began a legal case to prosecute the 
men who victimized her. 
Copyright © 
Donna DeCesare, 2001
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Bogotá, 
Colombia, 2001
Therapist Monica Berjano  
counsels an adolescent incest victim. 
The children use doll figures to aid  
in talking about traumatic events 
and strengthen their self-esteem. 
Renacer is an NGO that provides 
therapy for children who have been 
sexually abused. 
Copyright ©  
Donna DeCesare, 2001
Guatemala City,  
Guatemala, 2003
Guatemalan Police routinely search 
and detain gang members. Critics 
complain that the police engage 
in extra-judicial killings of youth 
suspected of belonging to gangs.
Copyright ©  
Donna DeCesare, 2003
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Medellín, Colombia, 2001
The barrios of Medellín are full of armed actors. Gangs often control territory, but guerrillas and paramilitary 
groups also contest power. The availability of handguns as well as assault rifles and the lack of state presence 
ensures domination by the armed groups. Even though they participate in criminal actions, people sometimes 
prefer the homegrown gangs because their members at least come from the community and hence have a greater 
sense of connection to people who live in their barrio than those who come from outside to take control. 
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2001
San Salvador, El Salvador, 2009
At a leadership training workshop on gender rights, a group of young women from one of the most impoverished 
and violent barrios lists suggestions for how to reduce violence in Salvadoran society. 
Copyright © Donna DeCesare, 2009
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U.S. Department of State
Diplomacy Lab at LACC
Reaching Out Together to Bring Americans
into the World of Foreign Policy
state.gov/s/sacsed/diplomacylab
Where?
The Diplomacy Lab at LACC is 1 of only 4 sites in the U.S.
What?
The Diplomacy Lab allows students to engage beyond the classroom, 
develop new ideas and solutions to the world’s toughest challenges, and 
contribute directly to the policy-making process.
Why?
Helps the U.S. Department of State tap into an underutilized reservoir of 
intellectual capital and bring American people into the world of foreign policy.
How?
Faculty-led teams of students at FIU are focusing on anti-corruption 
programs in Latin America and the Caribbean and the U.S. Department of 
State is channeling those findings directly into policy-making.
Forging Linkages across the Americas through education, research, outreach, and dialogue.
lacc.fiu.edu
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